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INTRODUCTION
With the sources of crude rubber concentrated
in the Middle East and shipments virtually at a stop since
the outbreak of war with Japan, the importance of rubber
in our present-day economic life has assumed new end sig-
nificant meaning.
Unlike iron, copper and cotton, which have been
commodities of outstanding importence for centuries, the
rubber industry and the resulting demand for the raw ma-
terial has all developed within a period of a little more
than one hundred years. The great growth in the United
States has been even more recent, paralleling the period
during which the automobile has come into prominence.
The object of this paper is not to present a
comprehensive picture of the American rubber Industry,
which would involve Information concerning the sources of
rubber, the nature of the material and the vexious stages
through which it goes in the process of manufacture. It
is intended to direct attention, however, to the develop-
ment of Britain as the controlling factor in production,
to Aaerica as the controlling factor in consumption and to
the economic problem inherent in America's dependency on
other nations, chiefly Great Britain, for supplies of
crude rubber.
11

The procedure followed has been to present (1)
a brief history of crude rubber production, showing on
the one hand concentration of supply under British con-
trol, (2) to outline the development of the American
rubber industry representing, on the other hand, central-
ized consumption and (3) from these diametrically opposite
or conflicting interests develop the resulting economic
problems
.
In the following pages an attempt has been made
to examine the effect of restrictive plans pieced into
operation by British legislation and to outline the dif-
ferent steps taken by American manufacturers to attain
partial, if not full, rubber independence.
Finally, in the concluding chapter, consideration
is given to new problems confronting the American rubber
industry since the outbreak of the Japanese war on
December 7, 1941.
iii

CHAPTER I
RUBBER «S CONTRIBUTION TO WORLD
PROGRESS IN INDUSTRY
A. Rubber a Negligible Fsctor in the Existence
of the Human Race until 1839
Rubber, as a commercial commodity, was a neglig-
ible factor in the existence of the human race until 1859.
Numerous attempts, it is true, were made before that time
to utilize crude rubber for the production of practical
commercial articles but without marked success. Because
crude rubber in its nat\iral state, even after coagulation
and smoking into sheets, is not generally useful, the in-
dustry was limited almost entirely to making unvulcanlzed
shoes of somewhat crude design. Showing marked sensitivity
to heat and cold and characterized by a disagreeable odor,
rubber articles in pre-vulcanization days could only be
considered as of questionable value by the general public.
The discovery of vulcanization by Charles Goodyear
in 1839 changed the entire course of rubber history, per-
mitting a doubtful and infant world industry to grow from
practically nothing to one averaging billions of dollars
annually.
The practical importance of vulcanized rubber is,
of course, attributable to its unique physical properties:
1

2elasticity, softness, toughness, impermeability, adhesive-
ness and resistance to electricity. No other natural sub-
stance is in any way comparable to rubber in the property
of elasticity. Characteristically, certain types of rubber
articles may be stretched to several times their normal
length and yet always return to their original proportions.
Rubber has been a powerful factor in the develop-
ment of American industry. There were 595 American concerns
engaged in the manufacture of rubber products in 1940, and
the industry gives employment directly to more then 150,000
men and women. (1) Thousands upon thousands of articles are
made of rubber: hot-water bottles, gloves, rubber hosing,
sheeting, boots and shoes, golf and tennis balls, conveyer
belts, erasers. Simply to mention these few suggests the
indispensible contribution of rubber to the convenience,
safety, health, pleasure and industrial effectiveness of
mankind. It also serves to show that there is hardly an
industry that is not indebted to rubber in some way —
automotive, aviation, shipping, railroad, radio, telephone,
telegraph and refrigeration.
Because the benefits of rubber, in its many forms,
are so vitally linked with modern everyday life, a study
of the development and economic importance of the industry
is in order.
1. Barker, P. W., Rubber; History, Production and
Manufacture, Dept. of Commerce, 1940

B. Brief History of the Development of Rubber
(1) Discovery of Rubber In Central and South America
Some historians are inclined to believe that
Columbus found crude rubber on the Island of Haiti on his
second voyage to South America in 1498.(1) This legend
or story is not, however, supported by fact. It is cer-
tain, nevertheless, that Spanish explorers found it in
Mexico about the year 1521.(2) The natives called the
substance "caoutchouc** which, translated, means *weeplng
tree." This, undoubtedly, was their way of expressing
their belief that the trees wept in the process of tapping.
How long the Indians had utilized "caoutchouc" is
not possible to determine. Their use of it was, no doubt,
limited and primitive. Oddly enough its primary importance
was in the field of sport. The explorers found the natives
playing a game with s ball of the material s ball which
bounced. Crude shoes were also made from the juice of the
same tree. Although white men had never seen a solid sub-
stance that would "Jiamp* away from another solid against
which it had been thrown, it seems extremely doubtful in
the light of later events and the slowness with which this
substance developed, if the Spanish explorers in any way
appreciated the value of their discovery. Certainly they
1. Encyclopaedia Brltannlca, 14th Ed., Vol. 19, New York
City, 19S8, p. 602.
2. Meramler, Prof. K. , The Science of Rubber , Relnhold
Publishing Co
.
, New York, 1934, p. 1,

4had no idea that they had found a material that was des-
tined to be a basic necessity in the development of mod-
ern civilization.
For 250 years little was done about the material.
Interest in it was not awakened until 1731 when Francois
Fresneau and Charles La Condamine, two French scientists,
were sent by the Paris Academy to investigate the sources
and uses of "caoutchouc," samples of which had gradually
found their way to Europe. This was the first concerted
effort made to investigate the possibilities of rubber.
Francois Fresneau and Charles La Condamine spent several
years in scientific investigation and travel in northern
South America. In 1751 the Joint report of these two
Frenchmen was published by the French Academy. (1) Their
findings indicate that they were probably the first white
men to really appreciate the commercial importance of
crude rubber.
(2) Utilization of Rubber
Between 1751 and 1859, when vulcanization was dis-
covered, little was accomplished in the development of this
new and strange material. However, it was surely, if slowly,
coming into its own.
1. Lawrence, J. C, Pioneers in the Commercial Development
of Rubber , "Journal of Chemical Education," Vol. VII,
August 1930, pp. 1788-1801.

5(a) Joseph Priestley's Discovery — In 1770
Joseph Priestley, an English chemist, better known as the
discoverer of oxygen, invited attention to *8 substance
excellently adapted to the purpose of wiping from paper
the marks of black lead pencil." (1) He discovered that
the gum woiald rub out pencil writing and referred to the
material as "rubber." Out of this new and insignificant
use, a new word was given to "caoutchouc" and added to the
English vocabulary, apparently for all time.
Between 1761 and 1768 two French chemists,
Herissant and Macquer, conducted pioneer research in the
application of rubber to making useful articles, with the
addition of oil, turpentine, and ether. (2) It was not un-
til several years later, however, almost ten years after
Francois Fresneau and Charles La Condamine*s investigations,
that the commercial use of rubber actually began. In 1791
an Englishman, Samuel Peal, patented a process for making
waterproof fabric by treating cloth with a solution of rub-
ber in turpentine. (5) A United States patent involving a
very similar process was issued to Jacob F. Hlmmel in 1813.
(4)
1. Lawrence, loc. cit .
2. Lawrence, 77~C.7"T^e World's Struggle with Rubber ,
Harper Bros., 1951, p. 5.
3. Loc. Cit.
4. Loc. Cit.

6(b) Charles Macintoshes Contribution Another
famous name associated with rubber Is that of Charles
Macintosh who put rubber Into practical use by developing
further the Idea of Samuel Peal. Charles Macintosh manu-
factured waterproof garments by Joining two fabrics to-
gether under pressure by means of a thin coating of rubber
In a solution of naptha. The rubber raincoats, made by
Macintosh, whose name today Is synonomous with the article
Itself, admittedly were not successful, because they became
hard and stiff In winter and soft and sticky In summer.
Nevertheless, what Charles Macintosh accomplished at the
beginning of the 19th century was the beginning of the rub-
ber garment industry, which today runs into millions of dol-
lars and sends its products throughout the world,
(c) Charles Goodyear* s Major Contribution —
Vulcanization -- Probably the greatest name in all rubber
history is that of Charles Goodyear, an American who dis-
covered vulcanization of rubber in 1839, That the process
consists of heating rubber with sulphur is generally pretty
well known. This, however, is not altogether exact. In
the one hundred years that have gone by since the process
was discovered, the greatest scientists in the world are
still piizzled. Chemists have claimed that vulcanization
is a chemical combination of rubber and sulphur; physicists

7that it is a purely physical process of rubber absorbing
brimstone. It is probably more likely that the effects
of vulcanization are due to the combined action of chem-
ical and physical forces. The controversy over whet vul-
canization is, however, decreases in importance when con-
sideration is given to what the process has made possible.
Prior to Charles Goodyear* s discovery, rubber
goods were characterized by a disagreeable odor, as well
as a marked sensitivity to heat and cold. Vulcanization
not only eliminated these unfavorable factors but added
more valuable qualities. In effect a new substsnce was
created. V\ilcanization made possible the changing of
sticky and odorous ""caoutchouc" from a plastic of limited
utility to a material that is non-adhesive , durable and
elastic over a wide range of temperatures. In fact, vul-
canization laid the foundation of rubber manufacturing as
it is known today. An unvulcanized rubber tire, for example,
would not hold pressure but would flatten out \mder the
lightest load. Unvulcanized articles also decompose and
lose their elasticity after a brief period of service.
Charles Goodyear obtained a patent for this revo-
lutionary discovery in 1844.
There are, of course, additional names that might
be mentioned in connection with vulcanization. IVhile the

8contributions of these men were not as outstanding as that
of Charles Goodyear, the years in which their discoveries
have been recorded for history indicate that the process
of vulcanization was not developed suddenly, nor was it
limited to any one country. Other inventors who had en-
deavored to vulcanize rubber were Peter Jones Bergius of
Sweden (1791), Friedrich Wilhelm Ludersdorff of Germany
(1852), Jan Van Guens of the Netherlands (1836) and
Nathaniel Haywood of Woburn, Massachusetts, the latter an
employee and collaborator of Charles Goodyear. To Charles
Goodyear, however, who perfected the process of vulcaniza-
tion and applied it to several hundreds of products in his
years of labor and experiments, is due greatest credit.
The combined discoveries of these men, many of which were
made independently, were of highest importance as they ren-
dered it possible to utilize rubber for a large number of
technical purposes for which the unvulcanized product was
unsuitable, and as a result the use of rubber has steadily
extended.
In a pamphlet now out of print, Charles Goodyear,
Jr., describes how his father discovered vulcanization. (1)
In conclusion he quotes the "interesting if prophetic cir-
cular," printed in 1844 and shown in the following pages
1. Vulcanization of Rubber . Pacts in relation to the
discovery by Charles Goodyear in 1839, "Boston Shoe
Recorder," Boston, Mass., 1886, (India Rubber World,
March 1, 1936), Vol. 93, p. 34.
9

9exhibiting Goodyear' s "original estimates of the adapta-
tion of his discovery to an almost infinite variety of
uses •
*
Circular (1)
"The subscriber has invented or discovered a
metallic Gum Elastic Composition.
He is prepared to demonstrate by ocular and ir-
resistible evidence that this Gum Elastic Composition pos-
sesses extraordinary and valuable qualities; namely, that
1. No degree of heat, without blaze, can melt
it. It remains unaltered in the torrid zone. Heat
without blaze, more intense than 280 degrees
Fahrenheit chars it like wood.
2. It continues flexible in any degree of cold.
The contact of ice itself does not stiffen it.
3. In durability it surpasses any other material
applicable to similar use.
4. Its elastic power is superior to that of com-
mon India rubber, and is retained unaffected by heat,
cold, or continued stretching.
5. Of itself, or in combination with fabrics of
cotton or other material, it can be made of any de-
sirable strength, with or without elasticity.
6. It resists the most powerful chemical reagents.
Aqua fortis, sulphuric acid, essential and common oils,
turpentine and other solvents, which destroy the native
gum, wood, leather and metals, produce no effect upon
this composition except that long continued immersions
in pure aqua fortis or sulphuric acid char it.
7. It possesses valuable medical qualities being
a substitute for oiled silk, furnishing hydrostatic
beds, and a great variety of articles used in s\irgery.
8. It, as well as the fabrics with which it is
used in combination, can be washed in boiling water,
with lime or lye, without injury.
1. Vulcanization of Rubber . Pacts in relatiin to the
discovery by Charles Goodyear in 1839, "Boston Shoe
Recorder," Boston, Mass., 1886, (India Rubber World,
March 1, 1936), Vol. 93, p. 34.
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9. Like other Gum Elnstic Composition, it
is water and air proof.
10. It is not liable to be injured by rats,
moths, or other vermin.
11. It can be moulded or embossed like wax,
and can be prepared in sheets of any thickness
and thinness.
I'ci, It will take any color.
15. It will take Japan varnish, and equals
in beauty patent leather, as it surpasses it in
many other qualities.
14. It takes impressions more delicately
than the finest paper.
15. It can be napped like broadcloth or plush.
16. It can be woven or braided.
17. It can be rendered perfectly tasteless
and inoffensive in point of color.
18. Its contraction, after having been stretched
in threads between two adhering thicknesses of cotton,
silk or other flexible materials, shirs or corrugates
the fabric in a new and beautiful manner, end renders
it applicable to a variety of uses.
He is also prepared to demonstrate, by means of
samples and other evidence, that this composition can and
will be advantageously employed in a great number of use-
ful ways
.
1. It is for many purposes a cheaper and
better substitute for leather.
2. It is for many purposes a cheaper
better substitute for cloth and haircloth.
and
3. It is for msny purposes a cheaper
better substitute for oiled cloth.
and
4. It is for many purposes a cheaper
better substitute for oiled silk.
and
i
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5. It is for many purposes a cheaper and
better substitute for paper and parchment.
b. The shirred or corrugated goods are pecul'
air and for many purposes unrivaled.
This composition cen be economically and use-
fully employed.
1. In almost every article of external cloth-
ing, particularly where protection from cold and
rain, or darability is desired.
2. In trimming carriages.
3. For harness of all kinds.
4. In building, particularly for roofs and
cisterns
.
5. In furniture (land & sea)
,
particularly
for carpets.
6. For firemen's dresses, for fire and water
hose
.
7. For the binding of books.
8. As a substitute for paper and parchment,
and for maps and charts,
9. For the canvas and rigging of ships, sup-
plying them also with compact boats, life preservers,
letter bags, perhaps with sheathing and caulking
materials
.
10. For belts and banding of machinery, and
for smith's bellows.
11. For bags, bagging, compact casks, rope and
tarpaulins, used in securing pnd transporting mer-
chandise, dry or liquid.
It is especially applicable to the wants of
government
.
I. To the post office it supplies the cheapest
and best mail bags rnd ship's letter bags. A bag,
waterproof, more durable then riveted leather.
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" incapable of sinking when filled with papers,
unaltered by climate.
II. To the Indian department it furnishes
an artificial buffalo robe cheaper and better than
any army blanket.
III. To the ^rmy it will supply:
1. Tents; 2, Tent csTpets; 3. Tarpaulins;
4. Gun covers; 5. Knapsacks; 6. Blankets;
7. Cartridge cylinders; 8. Pontoons; 9. Magazines;
10. Soldiers' dresses and equipment; 11. Baggage
wagon covers and appurtenances, securing to the
camp much of the safety and comfort of barracks.
IV. To the Navy it will furnish:
1. C&nvas for sails; 2. Rigging; 5. Boats;
4. Life preservers; 5. Buoys; 6. Fenders; 7. Gun
covers; 8. Gun breeching; 9. Spring cables; 10.
Perhci.ps she?: thing mbteri&ls; 11. Perhaps caulking
materials; 12. Carpets; 15. Awnings; 14. Tarpaulins;
15. Cartridge cylinders; 16. Fire screens; 17. Tanks
holding fresh water for ballast; 18. Hose; 19.
Buckets; 20. Magazines; 21. Water bags; 22. Provis-
ion bags; 25. Sailors' and marines' dress and equip-
ment; 24. Hammock cloths; hammocks and hammock bags.
The above mentioned are some of the qualities and
uses of tills composition. It is not pretended that all the
fabrics of this composition, alike, all the qualities, or
are applicable to all the uses, before enumerated; each kind
of fabric possesses those qualities which are desirable for
the uses to which it should be applied. A cloth intended to
sustain friction would be different from a cloth designed to
resist pulling or straining; and light semi-transparent fab-
rics, suitable for printing upon, being furnished by a pecul-
iar process, do not possess, as they do not reauire, some of
the qualities which are desirable in heavier goods. This
composition has already been subjectea to chemical analysis,
to thorough and practical tests by men of science and by the
government of the United States. In now presenting it to
the public the subscriber invites the most searching inves-
tigation -- the most severe trial.
New York, October 1844 Charles Goodyear "
(
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It Is clearly evident from this pamphlet that
Goodyear had a distinct conception, as far hack as 1844,
of the importance of his discovery, Miile it is true that
in the years which have passed many of the uses suggested
have either become outmoded or reduced to unimportance, in
some instances these "new uses* have become effective only
in recent years.
In following up these possible uses of vulcanized
rubber Charles Goodyear also established that the rubber
industry was founded on five fimdamental variables:
(1) Rubber, which could vary with every tree
from which it was drawn, with every Indian who
prepared it for shipment, with methods of packing,
shipment and storage, and with methods of prelim-
inary handling in a factory.
(2) Sulphur , the quantity of which included
in any given batch, could range from one per cent
to fifty per cent of the weight of the rubber in a
batch.
(3) Compounding ingredients and actuating
agents now so numerous as to offer infinite possi-
bilities for varying the character of rubber mix-
tures .
(4) The temperature of vulcanization , which
varies from that of superheated steam down to the
temperature of the room in which work is carried
on.
(5) The time of vulcanization , which may be
measured in minutes or hoiirs, depending upon the
ingredients in the compound and the article that
is being manufactured.
Effective and workable combinations of these var-
iables have permitted the rubber industry in the short
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period of one hundred years to become one of enormous and
increasing importance.
(3) Rubber Producing Plants and Their Distribution
Some two hundred trees, vines, shrubs, and plants
with no known botanical relationship, discovered in widely
scattered parts of the tropics, were found to yield latex.
They had been discovered and classified for the most part
prior to Goodyear »s experiments, but factory experience
demonstrated that the properties of these different trees,
vines, shrubs, and plants, collected from different sources,
varied in vitally important respects.
(a) Para Rubber Tree - Hevea Brasiliensis — The
trees giving the best quality of crude rubber were those
found in the Amazon Valley and named by the botanist, Charles
La Condamine, Hevea brasiliensis. This tree, native to
Brazil, was later transplanted and cultivated in the Far
East. Today it is found in British Malaya, Dutch East
Indies, India, Ceylon, Burma, Siam, French Indo-China,
Borneo, and Sarawak; and to a lesser extent in Panama,
Costa Rica, Mexico, Central America, West Indies, the
Philippines, and in Liberia and elsewhere in the African
tropics
.
(1)
1. Stevens, H. P., Rubber , Sir Isaac Pitman & Sons
(London, 1934), p. 9.

15
Crude rubber obtained from the Amazon Valley is
commonly known as Para, after the town of Para, from which
large shipments were exported. It is interesting to note
that although this port was later renamed Manaos, the term
"Para" has stuck and is still given to the best grade from
Brazil, Not only that, but all wild high-grade crude rub-
ber is known as "Para."
Latex obtained from the same species of tree was
found by man\ifacturers to differ as to the districts from
which it came. This, naturally, resulted in many grades.
The names of different rivers are used to designate these
grades, such as Acre, Madeira and Tapajos, Because the best
latex came from the upper reaches of the Amazon, it is read-
ily xmderstandable why •Up-River Pine Para" is considered
by the trade as "quality crude rubber." While quotations
for only a few of the different grades of wild rubber are
now available, the following prices will serve as an index
to the significance of each from the viewpoint of the manu-
facturer.
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TABLE NO. 1
New York >.^uotations on Grades of
Rubber as of December 28, 1941 (1)
Paras ; per lb .
Acre, Bolivian fine, washed and dried ,53
Upriver fine, washed and dried '^S^
Island fine, washed and dried .32
Beni, Bolivian fine ,30
Madeira, fine ,30
Acre, Bolivian fine ,29^
Island fine ,29
Upriver fine .29
Upriver coarse, washed and dried .22
Upriver coarse .16
Caucho:
Upper ball, washed and dried ,22
Upper ball ,16
Lower ball ,15^
Africans ;
Prime Niger flake ,28
Black Kassai ,18
Rio N\inez .18
(b) Gear a Rubber Tree The Cesra rubber tree.
also a native of Brazil, has likewise been introduced to
to nearly every tropical country. It has certain advanteges
over Hevea brasiliensis in that it is more hardy and can be
grown in drier soil. An important disadvantage, however,
is that Ceara trees are more difficult to tap. Crude rub-
ber from this species is reported today from East Africa,
Ugunda, Nyasaland; also from Ceylon and Southern India. (2)
1. Ibid
. , p. 30
2. InaTa Rubber World, Dec. 28, 1941
r
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(c) Funtumla Elastlca - Castllloa Elaatlca —
In Africa large plantations of the F\mt\mla elastlca, still
another species, are cultivated. Castilloa elastlca, on
the other hand, is indigenous to Central America and the
West Indies.
While there are a limited number of other rubber
trees they are considered inferior rubber bearers. Those
mentioned qualify as the more important with Hevea brasil-
iensis very much to the front,
(d) Plantation Area of World — For the most part
rubber bearing trees of commercial importance today are
confined to an area 10^ North and 10^ South of the Equator
where climate and soil conditions are favorable. This takes
in a belt of approximately two hundred fifty miles on either
side of the Equator and includes the Dutch East Indies,
British Malaya, parts of India and Ceylon, areas in Africa,
and countries in Central America, end northern South America.
While latex bearing plants are found outside the so-called
rubber belt, they are characterized by negligible rubber
content
,
The map on the following page indicates the con-
centration of rubber plantations in the countries and islands
of Southeastern Asia,

WORLD AREA PLANTED TO RUBBER
and PRODUCTION CAPACITY 1^40
Source: Rubber Manufacturers Association

ARABIAN
SEA
COLOMBO
WORLD AREA
AND PRODUCT
PLANTED TO RUBBER
ON CAPACITY, I940.
COUNTRY lOOO
ACRES
PER
CENT
1000
LONG TONS
PER
CENT
BR. MALAYA 3,467 38.8 633 37.0
N.E. I. 3,375 37.8 705 41.2
CEYLON 635 7. 1 103 6.0
BR. INDIA 1 35 1.5 1 7 1.0
BURMA 1 1 0 1.2 14 0.8
BORNEO 1 33 1.5 22 1.3
SARAWAK 240 2.7 46 2.7
THAILAND 397 4.4 52 3.1
FR.INDO-CHINA 330 3.7 73 4.3
TOTAL, restric-
tion countries 8,822** 98.7 1.665 97.4
REST OF WORLD iZOx*** 1.3 45 2.6
GRAND TOTAL 8,942 100.0 1.710 100.0
FORMOSA
PHILIPPINE
ISLANDS ^
0 ^
0
0
LEGEND
EACH DOT REPRESENTS 25000 ACRES
O SMALL ESTATES ASIATIC OWNED
• LARGE ESTATES MOSTLY EUROPEAN OWNED
H INCLUDES 900,000 ACRES NOT YET IN BEARING
INCLUDES WILD RUBBER
INCLUDES 60.000 NOT YET IN BEARING
lOOO ACRES
PERCENTAGE
APPROXIMATE SCALE IN MILES
RUBBER MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION , 444- MADISON AVE.^ NEW YORK CITY.
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Of the almost 900,000,000 acres \mder cultivation
In 1940, only 1»Z>% Is represented by countries outside this
region.
The latest available figures of the world area
planted to rubber show the following:
TABLE NO. 2
WORLD AREA PLANTED TO RUBBER - 1940
Country Acres Percent age
British Malaya 3,467,000 38.8^
Dutch East Indies 3,375,000 37.8
Ceylon 635,000 7.1
Thailand 397,000 4,4
French Indo-Chlna 330,000 3.7
Sarawak 240,000 2,7
British India 135,000 1.5
Borneo 133,000 1.5
Burma 110,000 1.2
All others. Including
Liberia,Brazll, other
areas In Africa, the
Philippines and South
America 120,000 1.3
Totals 8,942,000 100.
Source; Statistics published by the Rubber Manuf act\irers
Association, New York, N. Y., 1941
(e) Other Classifications for Rubber — All grades
of crude rubber may be classified as they were In Charles
Goodyear 's time; that Is, according to the final physical
properties of the finished article in which It may be used.
Those grades of crude rubber which after vulcanization pro-
duce a stock with satisfactory aging and wearing qualities.
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elasticity and resistance to abrasion, are said to be "hl^
tensile" rubber. Those rubbers which do not have these
properties in suitable degree are classified as "low-tensile"
strength and therefore, of low commercial value. Generally
speaking, other factors being equal, *wild" rubbers tend to
res\ilt in the production of "low tensile" goods; plantation
or cultivated rubber, in "high tensile" articles. The rea-
son for this is that wild rubbers in the main contain vary-
ing quantities of earth, sand, wood, and other impurities.
The United States Bureau of Standards has devel-
oped testing machines to measure the physical properties
of various rubber articles and Federal Specifications have
been established for all rubber articles supplied to govern-
mental agencies.
"High tensile" rubber in the early days of the
rubber industry was obtainable apparently from but few
areas, principally from Brazil. Between 1900 and 1905,
when world production of crude rubber approximated 55,000
tons a year, less than half qualified as "high tensile"
rubber. (1) This situation, coming as it did before the
industry had attained any appreciable proportions, must
have appeared to manufacturers as a possible and serious
limiting factor to the expansion of the rubber industry.
Up to that time no method had been developed whereby "low
tensile" rubbers might be converted into "high tensile"
rubbers.
1. Rubber Statistics 1900-1937, U.S. Dept. of Commerce,
Washington, 1958.
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(f) Contribution of Arthur H. Marks and George
Penslager — To Arthur H. Marks and his assistant
,
George
Oenslager, In 1906 and 1907, goes credit for the first
successful introduction of an organic accelerator in com-
mercial manufacturing practice.
Reduced to its most simple terms, an organic
accelerator is an activating agent that speeds up the mys-
terious change which takes place during vulcanization.
The combination of raw rubber and sulphur is ex-
tremely slow in working this change. When organic accel-
erators, such as white lead, calcium or magnesium (known
and used by the trade prior to the joint contribution of
Arthur H. Marks and George Oenslager) were used, the time
of "cure" was reduced, but not to any appreciable extent.
The discovery of organic accelerators, however,
quick- acting compounds of carbon with various other ele-
ments — markedly reduced the vulcanization period, chang-
ing it to a mere fraction of what it had been before.
The discovery, however, had even more far-reaching
significance. The introduction of these new substances
Increased the strength of the rubber and its resistance
to heat, abrasion, oxidation and aging. Certain grades of
rubber which in their nat\iral state gave only "low tensile"
compounds could be miraculously transformed to produce
"high tensile" articles. This permitted manufacturers to
use varying grades of rubber and still maintain relative
uniformity in their finished products.
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The advantages made possible by the introduction
of organic accelerator is reedily apparent in the follow-
ing example of the production of automobile tire stock.
A "cure" of two hours is needed to vulcanize e rubber-
sulphur mixture. The strength attained is 1150 pounds
per square inch. The piece stretches 6^ times. By adding
one-half of one per cent of accelerator and a little zinc
oxide, the time of "cure" is reduced to one hour. The fin-
ished product shows a strength of 2760 pounds per square
inch and a stretch of 6-| times. (1)
The significance of the Marks-Oenslager discovery
is such that in the annals of rubber history it takes its
place immediately after the discovery of vulcanization.
Jttiereas the first made the rubber industry possible; the
second, coming when it did, saved an investment of millions
of dollars and prepared the way for the expansion created
by a wide and seemingly ever increasing demand for rubber
products
.
1. Geer, William C, The Reign of Rubber , The Century
Company, (New York, 1922) p. 54.
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CHAPTER II
THE EVOLUTION OP BRITISH CONTROL IN THE
PRODUCTION OF CRUDE RUBBER
Crude rubber prior to 1900 was a native crop —
a rbrest product gathered by natives from natural unculti-
vated trees, shrubs, vines, or plants foiand principally in
Brazil, but also in other equatorial regions.
There is good reason to believe that the rubber
industry could never have attained its present size hsd it
been necessary to depend on this kind of careless and un-
controlled production. Price, supply and quality fluctu-
ated widely making the risk to engage in the manufacture
of rubber products financially unattractive.
The change from "wild" to "plantation" rubber
(rubber grown under scientific conditions) was not accom-
plished within one, two or even five years, chiefly because
rubber trees on the average require seven years to reach
maturity. Ten years after 1900 — in 1910 — Brazil was
still overwhelmingly dominant in the production of crude
rubber. The change, of course, came gradually but was
nevertheless definite. By 1922, 93 per cent of the world's
tonnage came from plantations in the Middle East.
23
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A. Decline of Brazil as a Rubber Power
and Rlae of Great Britain
Two unrelated developments are responsible for
the decline of Brazil as a rubber power and the ascendancy
of Oreat Britain, The first was an outgrowth of the en-
couragement given to experiments in rubber cultivation by
the British Government under Benjamin Disraeli's India
office from 1873 to 1877.
The second development resulted from the attempted
"cornering" of the Brazilian rubber output, originally in
1905-1906 when the price of rubber advanced from 61 cents
to $1,50 a pound and again in 1909-1910 when prices rose
from a low of 72 cents to a high of $3.06 per pound.
B. Encouragement Given to Experiments in Rubber
Cultivation by British Government between 1873 and 1877
The efforts of the British government to grow rub-
ber in British possessions in the Middle East resulted from
the imperialistic strivings of the Disraeli government.
History shows that Britain, under the guiding hand of
Benjamin Disraeli, expanded to new and greater heights in
the realm of world affairs during Queen Victoria's reign.
The increasing demand for rubber and the possibility of a
diminution in the supply, owing to the destruction of count-
less numbers of wild rubber-yielding plants doubtless pre-
sented Disraeli a real and rare opportunity.
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C. Contribution of Henry Wickham and Plantation
Beginnings in the Middle EasF
In 1871 a yoimg Britiski botanist, Henry Wickham,
published an account of his journey through South American
rubber forests. On its strength he was commissioned by the
India office to get Hevea brasiliensis seeds and bring them
back to England. Wickham returned on June 14, 1876 with
some 70,000 seeds of the Hevea brasiliensis trees, gathered
from the Tapajos plateau. Of this quantity, some 2,700
seeds germinated successfully when planted in Kew Gardens,
London. The young trees were sent from England to botani-
cal gardens near Colombo, Ceylon and from there, a year
later, to Singapore. From the plantings in Singapore and
other parts of British Malaya, the production of Hevea
brasiliensis spread throughout the Middle East. Prom them
the rubber plantation industry in the Middle East ultimately
developed. By 1904 the plantings in Ceylon had grown to
11,000 acres, but es late as 1910, 82.6 per cent of the
world production was still wild rubber. (1) High prices in
1910 and 1911 created further interest in planting and were
followed by rapid development (see Table 4, page 28). By
1914 the production of plantation rubber passed that of wild
rubbers, and the growth has continued to the point where to-
day wild rubber accounts for only two to three per cent of
the world's total (see Table 5, page 31).
1, World Production Rubber, Plantation and Wild
, U.S.
Dept. of Commerce, 1959.
I
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Naturally, more than casual interest in England
and tiie enthusiasm of botanists in the Middle East was re-
quired to make rubber planting a commercial success.
European planters, even with the automobile looming on the
horizon, were somewhat reluctant to respond to the prospect
of an expanding market for rubber.
The principal users of crude rubber, American
business men, were of like opinion. Speaking for American
industry before the New England Rubber Club in February,
1900, Colonel Samuel P. Cole, President of the United
States Rubber Company, said:
*The present demand for crude rubber is
greater than the normal supply. The culti-
vation of the rubber tree, which has been
undertaken in Mexico, Central America, Ceylon
and other countries, although so far not a
factor, may in time yield results. But neither
immediate nor permanent relief lies in this
direction. Such relief must be looked for in
increased production of rubber in those vast
regions which are watered by the Amazon and
the Congo, The material is all there in suf-
ficient quantities to supply our wants for a
hundred years, A little Yankee ingenuity could
readily increase the production sufficient to
meet our requirements. It is to the Para of
the Amazon Valley that we must look for the
permanent solution of the crude rubber prob-
lem. By systematic development and effort the
production of Para rubber can be established
on a permanent basis which will give it a posi-
tion among raw materials practically as reliable
as cotton or corn. The obstacles can be sur-
mounted. (1)
1. India Rubber World, Vol. 31, March 1905, p. 204.
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In J\ine 1904, India Rubber World published the
average price of rubber imported into the United States
for six years ending March 31, 1904. These average prices
are shown as follows:
TABLE 5
Cents
per lb.
1898-99 62.1
1899-00 64.9
1900-01 50.6
1901-02 49.4
1902-03 54.4
1903-04 68.2
D. Attempted *Cornering" of Brazilian Output
in 1905-06 and Again in 1909-10
(1) Effect in Prices
Taking advantage of the increased demand for rub-
ber to be utilized in automobile tires, a Brazilian specu-
lative program in 1905-06 attempted to influence the price
of the available supply. The efforts of the group were
markedly successfiil as the price of rubber was carried up
to $1.50 per pound and held at about $1.25 for almost a
year. This, it would seem, in the light of later events,
had a profound effect on the development of the British
plantation industry. The plantings recorded in Table 4
for the years 1904-15 show a steady increase, year by year
II
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TABLE 4
AREAS BROUGHT UNDER CULTIVATION IN THE
MIDDLE EAST THROUGH THE YEAR 1915
Year mnaal
Planting
Total
Acres
50,000
1905 100,000 150,000
1905 <jOO,000 350,000
1907 200,000 550,000
1908 200,000 750,000
1909 300,000 1,050,000
1910 400,000 1,450,000
1911 400,000 1,850,000
1912 400,000 2,250,000
1913 250,000 2,500,000
1915 250,000 3,000,000
Statistics issued by the Rubber Growers'
Association, Inc., London 1928, Table I, p. 7
No doubt, British appreciation of the possibilities inher-
ent in the dominance of rubber cultivation was directly-
responsible for this great and steady increase.
Added impetus was given to the movement when in
1909 and 1910 Brazilian speculators engineered a second
"cornering" of the market. In 1910 rubber sold for as high
as |3.25 per pound in New York, There can be little doubt
I
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that to the lure of the profits suggested by these high
prices can be traced the Investment of large sums of British
capital and the promotion of new plantation rubber companies.
(2) E^cpansion of Rubber Plantation In Middle East
Britain in 1909-1910 experienced a boom in rubber
shares that reached unexpected dimensions, or what has come
to be termed ""a veritable speculative insanity." (1)
Prom July 1 to November 1, 1909, seventy-seven
plantation companies were organized with a total capital
of 131,453,868. Between February 19 and March 20, 1910,
the shares of ten plantation companies chosen at random
rose in market value 37^ per cent. (2) Realization that
rubber could be profitably cultivated outside Brazil, in
British-controlled Ceylon and Malaya, created unprecedented
speculation by the British public. Fortunes were made and
lost. This headlong rush into rubber shares, nevertheless,
permitted British Interests, in a short time, to assume and
maintain control of world rubber production.
While Brazil during this period experienced its
rubber boom, other possible sources for rubber were being
exploited. Considerable attention was devoted to British
Africa with the object of preserving the existing wild
1. Wolf, Howard and Ralph, Rubber (A Story of Glory and
Qreed), Covlci-Frlede (New York City, 1936), p. 175.
2. Ibid., p. 174
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plants there and of encouraging rubber cultivation by-
European planters. Also the young plantations in the
Middle East, financed by British capital, began produc-
ing rubber successfully.
E. English Dominance in the Field of Crude Rubber
Established by 1922
By 1916 Brazil* s place in the production of rub-
ber was no longer a factor of importance (see Table No. 5,
page 31). Naturally, attempts were made by the Brazilian
government to reorganize and consolidate their position
in the face of this advancing march of plantation rubber.
On a steadily rising rubber market in 1908, the Banco de
Brasil made substantial advances to Brazilian producers
and dealers which permitted the holding of rubber. This
in time led to consolidation of Brazilian rubber-producing
interests and the formation of a rubber syndicate in 1909.
Reference has previously been made to the effect this
second "cornering" of the market in 1909-1910 (see page 28)
had in prices. Syndicate operators, however, were unsuc-
cessful in their attempts to support wild rubber prices.
In 1912, further efforts were made to reorganize the
Brazilian rubber industry so that it might continue to
compete with plantation rubber, but Brazilian speculative
interests, in their attempts to influence the natural price
of rubber as determined by the law of supply and demand.
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had unwittingly brought a new type of competition into
the market. Not only was plantation rubber cleaner but
it cost less to produce. The American Importer could
obtain plantation rubber, a better product, from the
Middle East, for less than he could wild rubber from the
Amazon, Brazil as a rubber factor, thereupon declined
qui ckly
.
The great growth of the American automotive in-
dustry between 1905 and 1920 gave stimulation to the de-
velopment of the rubber industry. The rise of the United
States as a consumer of crude rubber from 1910 to 1920 is
graphically shown on Chart A, and will be further elab-
orated upon in Chapter III. Dominance in the field of
crude rubber production by 1922 rested in the hends of
the English nation. By that time 69% of the total acreage
of plentation rubber was controlled by domicile in British
colonies and a total of 75^ through British ownership of
plantations in the Dutch East Indies. (1)
On the other hand, consumption of rubber was
centered in another country, the United States, which in
1922 consumed 12% of the world's supple. (2)
The situation thus created resulted in an unique
economic struggle to control the price of rubber. It is,
1. "Rubber, History & Production," World Rubber Statistics
,
Dept. of Commerce, 1940, p. 45.
2. Loc. cit.
Ii
Chart A,
Rise of the United States as a
Consumer of Crude Ruhber
000
Tons
AOO
300
200
100
1910 1914 1919 1922
From - GtatiBtics on Y/orld Rubber Consumption
British Rubber G-rowers Assoc. June 1325.
i
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accordingly, not anomelous that this essential commodity
should fall to half its average cost within each twelve-
month period of seventeen out of twenty-five years (1905-
1930) or rise to double that cost. Extreme instability
of price has been the long-time rule, instead of the ex-
ception, in the crude rubber market.

34
CHAPTER III
BACKGROUND OF EARLY AMERICAN RUBBER INDUSTRY
AND DEVELOPMENT OF AMERIC;^ AS THE LARGEST
CONSUMER OF CRUDE RUBBER
The economic position occupied by rubber goods
man\ifacturing in the industrial structure of the United
States today is rarely appreciated except by some of those
actually engaged in the industry. This is ell the more
remarkable when comparison with other major industries
Indicates that according to value of products produced
rubber goods in 1957 ranked thirteenth. In Table No. 6,
which gives date for the year 1937, the importance of the
production of rubber goods in the United States is at once
apparent.
The scarcity of available information during the
period of early development of the rubber industry in this
country presents a somewhat difficult obstacle in tracing
its history. Although it is known that unvulcenized rub-
ber goods, such as rubber shoes and small quantities of
crude rubber were imported prior to Charles Goodyear *s
discovery of vulcanization, the first official statistics
on rubber shoes were not reported until 1848 and on crude
rubber until the year ending June 30, 1855.(1)
Estimates made as a result of painstaking re-
search for the period 1826-1848 and correlation of
1. Holt, E.G., India Rubber World, "Early American
Rubber Industry," (Jan. 1938) p. 42.
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TABLE 6
MAJOR INDUSTRIES (1937 BIENNIAL CENSUS OP
MANUFACTURING) RANKED BY VALUE OP
PRODUCTS PRODUCED
Nmnber of Number of Value*
Establish- Wage of
ments Earners Products
Steel Works. Rolllne Mills 4 ry
,
t.A O 3 . 330 . 491
motor cvcles) ioJ. ±94
,
I 3.-96.219
Meat Packinff ^wholesale) 1 , lOU A nn%( ( 2.787 .358
P^i"T»r*1 **TiTn Rpf*1 tia'Pat ooo 1 ftp
Motor Vehicles « Bodies and
motor vehicle parts 936 284,814 2,080,018
Electrical Machinery,
Apparatus end Supplies 1 ,435 257, 660 1,622,098
Bread and other Bakery Products 17 ,193 239, 388 1,426,163
Printing and Publishing
Newspapers and Periodicals 9 ,244 135, 215 1,396,031
Cigarettes 34 26, 149 968,927
Cotton Woven Goods (over 12"
in breadth) 677 336, 104 967,110
Machinery (mlscel,) 2 ,298 146, 712 964,151
Paper 647 110, 809 957,940
Chemical (miscel.
)
601 78, 951 932,750
Rubber Products (boots, shoes.
tires and inner tubes, misc.) 478 129, 818 883,032
Plour and other Grain Mill
Products 2 ,238 26, 390 856,310
000 omitted
Source: 1937 Biennial Census of Manufacturing
I(
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Indicative data with actual figures thereafter by
E. 0. Holt, Acting Chief, Leather end Ruhher Division,
United States Department of Commerce, (1) show interest-
ingly enough that the United States industry required
twenty-five years to reach an annual import figure of
1,000 long tons by 1851, but only another twenty years to
bring its annual imports to approximately 5,000 long tons
by 1871.
Analysis of the figures presented in Table 7 re-
veal numerous facts: the years grouped under "i*" show the
influence of the rubber bocan of the early 1850* s; \mder
"B" the rapid growth of imports which took place after
Charles Goodyear* s invention of vizlcanization became oper-
ative (1845-1854); under "C" the sharp decline that fol-
lowed the refusal of French and British Courts to uphold
Goodyear* s patents in 1855, leading almost directly to the
loss of American export trade in rubber products; under "D*
the retarding effects of the Civil War and the loss of mar-
kets in the southern states in development of the industry
and finally, under "E" its quick recovery and expansion
after the close of the Civil War.
A. Founding of the First American Rubber Factory
The year 1859 marked the birth of the rubber in-
dustry not only for the world in general but the United
1. India Rubber tforld, Feb. 1, 1958, p. 41.
I
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TABLE 7
ESTIMATED UNITED STATES GROSS IMPORTS
OP RUBBER - 1826-1871
Long Long
Year Tons Value Year Tons Value
1826 8 |3,458 1849 570 |318,759
1827 23 10,289 1850 613 343,316
1828 50 22,489 Group 1851 1,221 684,764
1829 130 58,436 B 1852 1,078 603,072
1830 161 72,075 1853 1,648 922,602
Group 1854 2,895 1,944,999
A 1831 176 78,324
1832 483 216,169 1855 2,464 1,660,141
1833 456 204,407 1856 1,554 1,045,576
1834 541 242,715 Group 1857 1,237 832,058
1835 382 171,355 C 1858 1,052 708,231
1836 298 133,545 1859 1,462 983,944
1837 465 208,509
1860 2,120 1,427,142
1838 160 71,770 1861 1,870 1,245,373
1839 153 68,825 Group 1862 1,110 728,230
1840 262 117,396 D 1863 2,290 1,476,140
1841 344 153,877 1864 2,815 1,702,741
1842 382 171,898 1865 1,760 1,223,055
Group
B 1843(9 mo. )141 79,065 1866 1,913 1,459,586
1844 208 116,421 1867 3,320 2,388,288
1845 401 224,756 Group 1868 3,789 2,192,691
1846 426 238,725 E 1869 3,488 2,505,632
1847 441 247,059 1870 4,296 3,459,665
1848 773 432,949 1871 4,925 4,390,776
Years ended Sept 30 through 1842; then 9 months to June 30,
1843; then years ended June 30 through 1871. Calendar year
summary data thereafter available.
From estimates of E. G. Holt, India Rubber World, Feb, 1
1938, p. 43.
For later figures see Table 10.
1
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States in particular. Previous to that time the quality of
products made from rubber had been so poor that its use was
declining. Shortly after Goodyear* s major experiment had
been proved workable, the Roxbury Rubber Company (later
changed to the Boston Belting Company) Roxbia*y, Massachusetts,
began manufacturing goods by the Goodyear process.
B. Rapid Development of Industry from 1849-1B79
The industry did not grow quickly but did expand
steadily. The 1850 census was the first to provide any re-
liable information regarding the American rubber manufactur-
ing industry. These figures reveal the following information:
1849 Census Data on United
States Rubber Industry (1)
Compan- Employ- Mater-
'~
Industry ies Capital ees Wages ials Products
India Rubber
Goods 34 $1,455,700 2568 $537,828 #1,608,728 #3,024,335
Suspenders 5 20,800 362 33,756 75,300 171,000
Webbing 2 8,000 34 6,408 11,024 15,400
ir $1,484,500 256? $577,992 $1,695,052 $3,210,735
Of the thirty-four concerns making India rubber goods
in 1849, nine were in New York, eight in Connecticut, six in
New Jersey, five in Massachusetts, two each in Rhode Island
and Maryland and one each in New Hampshire and Pennsylvania.
1. Census of Manufacturers, The Rubber Industries (U, S. Dept.
of Commerce Bureau of Census), Washington, D.C., 1849
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It ia readily apparent that the average company had an In-
vested capital of |42,820.00, employed 75 people and pro-
duced goods to the value of |89,000.00.
The census of 1859 showed a decrease In the number
of companies reported -- 27. Ten years later, however, the
1869 census reported 56 concerns engaged in the manufacture
of India rubber and elastic goods,
1859 and 1869 Census Data on XMited
States Rubber Industry (1)
India Rubber Employ-
Goods Capital ees Wages Materials Products
Years Co* s
1659 "27~ 13,534,000 2,768 $794,570 #3,056,360 #5,642,700
1869 56 7,486,605 6,025 2,559,877 7,434,742 14,566,374
Comparison of these data for 1859 and 1869 show an
increase in the average capitalization from #43,000 to more
than #130,000 and the average number of employees per fac-
tory from 75 to 108.
Production figures reported for 1869 indicate that
rubber boots and shoes were the leading items with a produc-
tion of over 5,400,000 pairs. The industry in that year
attained a production value of #14,594,191 and the diver-
sity of products were indicative of its future trend. Rubber
footwear and apparel, mechanical rubber goods, druggists*
1. Ibid., 1859 and 1869.
\
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sundries, rubberized and elastic fabrics, toys and balls
and hard rubber goods are typical of the goods made and
reported. Following the development of the American in-
dustry for another ten years. It would seem that up to
1879 rubber was strengthening itself for the big fut\ire
which lay ahead. Between 1869 and 1879 many inventions
were patented, some workable, others too far in advance
of the times. Vulcanization among other things had made
rubber sufficiently permanent as to attract the attention
of inventive minds both in America and abroad.
Table 8 shows the steady expansion of the
American rubber industry from its modest beginning in 1849,
when figures were first reported, up to 1937, the latest
year for which data are available.

41
TABLE 8
GROaiTH OP AMERICAN RUBBER INDUSTRY
PROM 1849 TO 1959
Year
Nximber of
Establishments
Value of
Products
in thousands of
dollars
1849 34 3,024
1859 29 5,768
1869 56 14,566
1879 104 25,310
1889 167 42.854
1899 301 99,881
1904 265 148,015
1909 267 197,394
1914 342 300,994
1919 477 1,138, 216
1921 496 704,903
1923 529 958,518
1925 530 1,260,805
1927 516 1,225,077
1929 525 1,117,460
1931 453 614,265
1933 408 472,744
1935 466 677,659
1937 478 883,032
Source: Statistical Abstract of the United States
and Census of Manufacturers
The latest biennial report of the Census of
Manufacturers (1937) lists 478 establishments in the rubber
industry, employing 149,965 people and producing $883,032,546
worth of rubber products. Today rubber manufacturing indus-
tries are located in about 35 of the 48 states, with the
I
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principal center around Akron, Ohio, and other large centers
in New England, the Middle Atlantic states, Michigan,
California, Colorado and Alabama,
C . Growth of Industry Concurrent with Rapid
Development of Automotive Industry
It was not until the advent of the automobile and
the pnexamatlc tire that the American rubber industry began
to assume its role of the world* s largest consumer of crude
rubber. Prior to 1911 the growth of the industry was slow
but with the development of the automobile it expanded very
rapidly. America's need for rubber and the way in which it
was utilized (in tires) is shown by the tremendous increase
in passenger car and truck registrations. While in 1913
passenger and truck registrations of 1,258,062 were re-
ported. In 1920 they had increased to 9,231,941.(1) (See
Table 9) The value of rubber factory production between
1914 and 1919 changed from |300,993,796 to $1,138,216,019.
Table 8, on page 41, shows this rapid growth in more detail,
D. Akron, Ohio, Center of the American Rubber Industry
The growth of Akron as the center of the American
rubber industry presents an interesting story. While the
industry originated in New England and the Middle Atlantic
States, as did other early American industries, in 1870,
1. Standard Statistics, 1940.
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TABLE 9
AUTOMOBILE REGISTRATIONS - UNITED STATES
1910 - 1922
Passenger
Year Cars Trucks
1910 458,500 10,000
1911 619 , 500 20,000
1912 902,600 41,400
1913 1,194,262 63,800
1914 1,625,739 85,600
1915 2,309,666 136,000
1916 3,297,996 215,000
1917 4,657,340 326,000
1918 5,621,617 525,000
1919 6,771,074 794,372
1920 8,225,859 1,006,082
1921 9,346,195 1,118,520
1922 10,864,128 1,375,725
Soiirce: "Pacts and Figures of the Automobile Industry,"
National Automobile Chamber of Commerce, New
York, 1939, p. 5
Dr. Benjamin P. Goodrich was induced to move his business
to Akron from Hastings-on-Hudaon, New York, There are
numerous stories extant as to the reasons why Dr. Goodrich
forsook New York. The most natural one is that he was los-
ing money in the Hastings-on-Hudson business and made his
move when the opportunity presented itself, to Akron to
escape competition. (1) The new venture prospered and other
companies were likewise established in Akron. This mid-
western city appeared to have many natural advantages for
1. Wolf, Howard and Ralph, op. cit. , p. 402
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manufacturing industries and Akron very soon had what may
be termed a "resident-labor force" skilled in the manu-
facture of rubber goods. This, together with the advan-
tageous location of Akron as a natural center for national
distribution, was instrumental in inducing many companies
to select Akron as their base of operations. The B, P.
Goodrich Company, the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company,
the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company and the United States
Rubber Company all started their present far-flung opera-
tions in Akron at the beginning of the twentieth century.
By 1919 Akron was credited as producing more than
half the total value of rubber goods, winning for itself
the title ^'Tire Capital" of the world,
E. Rubber Age Born with Americans Entry
into World War I
During these stages of development the rubber in-
dustry had, in the light of later events, just been prepar-
ing itself for the World War and the accomplishment of new
and apparently impossible tasks.
The use of the automobile and rubber tires for
transport developed to a degree that had not been believed
possible. In addition to meeting the increased demand for
rubber tires by the Army, the rubber industry was called
upon to make gas masks that would lessen the horrors of
chemical warfare. This, in itself, was no small task as
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all that rubber chemists and engineers knew about gas masks
was restricted to the study of some of German design. The
problems of design, material and production were success-
fully and efficiently solved by an Industry given to war
production. The part played by American-made gas masks In
saving the lives of Allied soldiers Is a matter of record.
Rubber was also needed and used for balloon bags.
It played Its part In the recoil mechanism of big guns, and
In aeronautical development. Rubber gloves, rubber tubing,
rubber hot water bottles, and rubber sheeting assisted the
Medical Corps to care for the wounded.
These various factors all contributed to a great
expansion In the American rubber Industry.
Due to the stoppage or destruction of some of the
rubber manufacturing Industries In European countries, at
the conclusion of hostilities, America was consuming 12% of
the world's total supply of rubber. Between 1914 and 1919,
therefore. It may fairly be said that the American rubber
Industry became of age. This position was maintained until
192b. Thereafter Increasing production of rubber goods In
other countries was such that although American production
was still gaining. Its percentage of total Imports of crude
rubber steadily declined (see Table 10).
1
TABLE 10
ESTIMATED WORLD RUBBER ABSORPTION - 1900-1937
(thousands of long tons)
Year
United
States
United
Kingdom Germany Japan Prance
Other
Coun-
tries
Total
Av.1900- 04 23 9 11 55
1905-09 31 14 11 4 16 76
1910-•14 51 20 14 1 5 23 113
1915-•19 15 25 5 14 23 218
1920 206 26 12 5 14 31 294
1921 178 18 22 22 15 22 277
1922 301 10 28 16 24 29 408
1923 319 27 19 15 27 39 446
1924 329 22 23 20 30 42 466
1925 388 30 34 11 33 58 554
1926 366 40 23 18 34 60 541
1927 373 45 39 21 34 94 596
1928 437 49 38 26 36 98 684
1929 469 72 49 34 59 121 802
1930 376 75 45 33 69 111 709
1931 355 77 40 43 46 120 681
1932 337 79 45 56 41 154 692
1933 412 80 54 67 62 150 825
1934 462 110 59 70 50 188 939
1935 492 95 63 58 51 180 939
1936 575 100 72 62 57 180 1,046
1937 544 115 98 62 59 226 1,104
Source: Survey of Current Business, August 1938
1I
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p. Virtual Amerlcsji Control of Demand
for Rut)t?er Eatebllshed by 1922
Analysis of import figures shows that from the
early 1850' s dovai to 1914, Just prior to the outbreak of
activities in Europe, this country imported 50% of all
crude rubber produced. Between 1915 and 1922, however,
8S a result of war demands, America's consumption rose to
72^, This meant that the control of demand or consumption
was notably centralized in the hands of American manufac-
turers. By this time, as a result of the great increase
in plantation rubber in the Middle East however, the con-
trol of the supply of rubber rested In the hands of another
nation Great Britain.
By 1922, therefore, conditions in the world rub-
ber situation were such that two opposing factions had
developed. On the one side powerful British interests con-
trolled three-quarters of all rubber produced; on the other,
the hxige American rubber industry consumed approximately
three-quarters of all the world's rubber supply.
iI
CHAPTER IV
FACTORS CONTRIBUTING TO ECONOMIC INSTABILITY
IN THE AMERICAN RUBBER INDUSIRY
A. British Control of Supply - American Control of Demand
The unique problem which confronted the American
rubber industry in 1922 (and still continues to be en eco-
nomic problem of magnitude) was that production end price
of its principal raw material, crude rubber, was elmost
exclusively in the hands of foreign countries, chiefly
Oreat Britain. Although American consumption was then
close to three-quarters of world production, end today
is still approximately half of the total supply of rubber,
only an infinitesimal amount of crude rubber is produced
in American-owned or leased plantations.
The reason for this and the apparent lack of in-
terest on the part of American manvifacturers in the "plan-
tation business" may be summarized as follows:
(1) There was no known suitable land for plant-
ing Hevea trees under the American flag.
(2) The plantation industry was not attractive
to American investors because of the ten-
year waiting period between planting and
product,
(3) Restrictive schemes, stimulating native
planting and wild production in areas not
subject to restriction forecast over pro-
duction of rubber and discouraged invest-
ment .
48
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(4) Available financial resources of most of
the individual manuf actiiring concerns in
the United States were needed for expan-
sion of their own manufacturing and dis-
tributing facilities.
This concentration of supply, vested in the hands
of one country and the control of demand resting in the
hands of another were, of course, of vital importance in
the attempt to control the price of rubber as evidenced
in the Stevenson Restriction Plan (see page 52)*
Certain other economic factors, applicable to rub-
ber production, must also be taken into consideration if
the introduction of government control in the industry is
to be properly appreciated.
B. Economic Aspects of Rubber Production
(1) The demand for manufactured rubber goods is com-
paratively inelastic. That is, the price of crude rubber
may double, as it did in 1923, without affecting noticeably
the amount consimied. This inelasticity results largely
from the great amount of rubber consumed in the manufac-
tvire of tires, tire casings, etc. — approximately 75-855^
of the total. The demand for tires is of course so closely
tied in with the demand for cars (and the price of tires is
so small ccmipared to the price of an automobile) that a rise
in the price of crude rubber does not tend to reduce demand.
On the other hand, where the demand for automobiles, and
1
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with It the demand for tires, exceeds the current supply
of rubber, there is a speedy reaction upwards in the price
of rubber.
(2) The supply of rubber is likewise inelastic. With-
in a short period of time it is difficult to increase or
decrease to any appreciable extent the quantity available.
Because it takes from five to seven years for a rubber tree
to reach the "tapping" stage, a rise in price, when produc-
tion is at capacity, does not result in an immediate marked
increase in supply. A decrease in the price of rubber, in
the same way, does not result immediately in reducing the
supply. A rubber plantation represents a huge fixed in-
vestment — the maintenance of a large number of native
workers, usually \mder contract for a period of two to
three years, and a staff of "resident" rubber technicians --
which cannot be converted to any other use without great
loss. Therefore, in times of low prices it is expedient
to continue operating, even at a loss.
A further characteristic of the rubber supply
which strengthens the elasticity of supply and gives it
a tendency to expand with falling prices, instead of con-
tracting, is the large number of small native producers.
This is explained by an expert on rubber in the following
way:
falling prices may actually stimulate
production. The tapper or small owner oper-
ator desires to make a certain wage. At the
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higher price of rubber he produces less and
has more time for leisure, irtiile as price
drops he works harder and throws more rubber
on the market in order to maintain his
accustomed standard of living," (1)
C. Repercussions from Collapse oif American Demand
Between 1915 and 1920 American business in gen-
eral e^qperienced e period of unusual prosperity. The rub-
ber industry likewise rode on the crest of the wave. This
five-year period was one of expansion known to economists
as the "boom" In the business cycle. New companies sprang
into existence; old, established firms extended their
holdings and enlarged their productive cepacity. With
speculation the order of the day, immense fortunes were
made in the stock market. In Akron, Ohio, alone it was
estimated that there were between eighty and one hundred
and twenty millionaires at the beginning of 1920. (2) Plumb-
ers and bricklayers earned as much as |90.00 a week, tire
department hands commonly drew down $60.00 to $70.00 as
their weekly stipend.
In June, 1920, however, almost overnight, the
nation's post-war boom business fell apart. Rubber goods
man\]fact\irers, who had expanded on borrowed money, in par-
ticular found themselves with huge inventories of high-
priced finished goods on hand.
,
This sudden turn in the
market value of their finished product meant an inventory
1. Luytjes, A., Native Rubber Cultivation in the Dutch
East Indies
, Charles Grenier & Sons, Ltd., 1927, p. 6.
2. Wolf, Qp"7~cit., p. 440.
i
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loss running Into millions of dollars. Raw material com-
mitments made In anticipation of business which did not
materialize added to their burden. Tire orders literal-
ly stopped, cotton prices tobogganed and rubber prices al-
so skidded swiftly downhill. The American motorist In the
midst of a depression readjusted his budget and saw to It
that he got all the mileage possible out of the tires he
had. New car sales likewise reflected a downward trend.
American consumption of rubber, so vitally connected with
the automotive Industry, fell off precipitously to 177,772
tons from 215,000 tons In 1919, a decline of 17.3^. Anal-
ysis of business failures reported by the H. G. Dunn
Company Indicates that by the end of 1920 It would have
been difficult to find three financially sound or really
solvent rubber companies In the United States. (1)
(1) Effect In the Price of Rubber
The industrial and trade depression of 1920 had
an Immediate effect on the price of rubber, particularly
In view of the expanded output. Tire orders were not forth-
coming and cotton prices declined drastically. Rubber so
closely tied to the automotive Industry reacted In like
manner. Another factor which also had its repercussions
In the Middle East was the introduction of the cord tire
which had a much longer life than the fabric tire and so
1, Dunn's Review, June 1921.
i-
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reduced the demand for rubber for replacements. Table
No. 11, on the following page, reflects a low price of
sixteen cents per pound for rubber and a high of 56^^
during 1920.
(2) Distress of Plantation Companies
The 1920 depression was not limited to the United
States; English manufacturers found themselves in a sim-
ilarly unhappy state.
With the collapse of American demand (then run-
ning at approximately 72^ of the world's supply of crude
rubber) and the falling off in similar fashion of British
demand the immediate reaction on the producers of crude
rubber was inevitable. The distress of plantation com-
panies, developed on borrowed money and operated in the
face of a continued increase in demand and high prices
was real. No provisions apparently had been made for a
possible diminution in demand.
Between June 1920 and June 1922 American manu-
facturers of rubber goods limited their purchase of crude
rubber to the minimum quantity required to fill out or
augment stocks on hand. By the end of 1920 crude rubber
was selling for as little as 19 1/8 cents per pound. To
counteract the trend of prices voluntary restriction of
output was attempted by Par Eastern producers but without
much success. The price of rubber did reach 28 cents per

TABLE 11
CRUDE RUBBER PLANTATION RUBBER SMOKE SHEET
#1. PRICE CHANGES AND AVERAGE SPOT PRICES
NEW YORK, N. Y. 1910-1922
Price per Pound
Year Low Hign
Pluctu-
a.T/ion (X;
Aver-
age (d)
±VXU QQ /'*\
<fX • 4 r
1 Ql 1 7n X4X . O
1 Q1 QX9 JL 6 1 OftX • WO 1 ACi X <<X « O
X • X o . ot o<:> . u
1914 • 56 .93 .37 65.3
1915 .58^ .79
.20i 65.7
1916 .55 1.02 .47 72.5
1917 . .52 .90 .38 72.2
1918 .40 .70 .30 60.1
1919
.38i .67 .18^ 48.7
1920 .16 .56^
.40i 36.3
1921 .Hi .21^
.09f 16.4
1922 .13 1/8 .28 3/8
.12f 17.3
1. Between high and low given
2. Of daily closing prices
3. Of prices on first day of month
Source: U. S. Tariff Commission Report,
Crude Rubber, Nov. 1939, p. 24.
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poimd in June 1921, but weak or marginal plantation com-
panies needing money were apparently unable to withhold
their output regardless of the effect on the market. In-
evitably the price of rubber fell again. The voluntary
restriction agreement among plantation owners was not re-
newed. The plight of British rubber growers in the Far
East was so grave in 1921 that they sought relief through
legislation. This, however, was only one of many post-
war problems confronting the British government. Never-
theless, it was an important one as British capital, ag-
gregating |500,000,000 to $750,000,000 was at stake.
The problem was also unique in respect that any burden
the British government might impose on rubber consumers
to assist rubber producers would react to the advantage
of Britain and the disadvantage of the United States.
D. Formulation of the Stevenson Committee to
Inquire into the State of the Rubber Industry
As an outgrowth of this distress on October 24,
1921, the British Colonial Office appointed the Stevenson
Committee to investigate and report on the plantation
rubber industry. By May 1922 the Committee published its
initial report, supplemented by a second in October 1922,
recommending restriction of 25^ in rubber output in
Malaya and Ceylon. Efforts to bring the Netherlands
Indies, then producing approximately 25^^ of the world's
I
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total rubber output, within the scope of the plan were
unsuccessful. The restrictive regulations became law on
November 1, 1922 and were effective through November 1,
1928. In that short space of six years, however, the
British plan had a profound effect alike on the price of
crude rubber and on the American rubber industry.
E. Brief Outline of Stevenson Restriction Plan
Effective from November 1, 1922 to November 1, 1928
The plan, as passed in November 1922 may be sum-
marized as follows: It provided for an assessment of in-
dividual rubber plantations, under British control, accord-
ing to their ability to produce. The actual output of each
plantation during the twelve-month period ending October 31,
1920, was adopted as standard, and 60^ of this standard
production established for the first quarterly quota per-
iod. The amount of rubber that might be exported during
future periods was to be declared quarterly in accordance
with the London market price for rubber. Changes in the
exportable quota were provided for in case the average
market price over quarterly periods was above or below
certain pivotal levels.
P. Price Cycles During Time Crude Rubber
Restriction Plan Was Operative
The upward movement of rubber prices immediately
following the enactment of the Stevenson Restriction Plan
I1
1
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is shown by Table No. 12. Whereas the average New York
price of plantation rubber for the twelve months prior to
October 1922 had been just under 16 cents per pound during
the first year of restriction it averaged nearly 20 cents
and later a high degree of stability was maintained. Ad-
mittedly the first year of restriction was successful and
satisfactory alike to British and American interests. The
upward trend of prices apparently caused no undue concern
on the part of American manufacturers. There is record
that the Rubber Manufacturers Association of America in-
vited a committee, representatives of the Rubber Growers
Association (British) to this coiintry to discuss and ex-
plain the situation. Because nothing definite was done
at the time it would seem that the British Committee suc-
ceeded in convincing American manufacturers that there was
nothing prejudicial behind the plan; rather that it had
been framed to even out the violent fluctuations in price
which were bad alike for the producers and users of rubber.
During the first year the plan was operative it
fully justified the claims of its sponsors. By the middle
of 1924, however, the price of rubber had dropped to 18
cents a pound. A factor which contributed to this in no
small measure was the great increase in output by the
Netherlands East Indies. Coupled with a falling off of
business in the rubber manufacturing industry this had an
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TABLE 12
RUBBER QUOTAS, PRICES AND WORLD STOCKS
UNDER THE STEVENSON ACT 1922-1928
^ New York Spot World Stocks
Exportable (1) Rubber Price at end of
Quarter Year Percentage High (2) Low(2) Quarter; Num-
Cents Cents ber of Months*
(per lb.) (per lb.) Supply
Fourth 1922 60 .24 .29 6
First 1923 60 .28 .36 7
Second 1923 65 .30 .27 7
Third 1923 60 .30 .28 6
Fourth 1923 60 .28 .26 6
First 1924 60 .26 .20 5
Second 1924 60 .24 .18
Third 1924 55 .32 .24 4
Fourth 1924 50 .38 .32
First 1925 55 .34 .42
Second 1925 65 1.08 .42 5
Third 1925 75 .98 .84 3
Fourth 1925 85 1.02 .70 5i
First 1926 100 .70 .50 4
Second 1926 100 .50 .40
Third 1926 100 .42 .40
Fourth 1926 80 .42 .38
First 1927 70 .42 .38
Second 1927 60 .42 .35
Third 1927 60 .35 .34
Fourth 1927 60 .40 .36
First 1928 60 .40 .19 5
Second 1928 60 .20 .19 5
Third 1928 60 .20 .18 4
1 . 1005^ or Standard = output of each plantation during twelve-
month period ending October 21, 1920.
2. High and low prices are the average high or low price for
any one month, actual daily high or low not being available.
Source: From chart prepared by E. L. Holt, Asst. Chief
Leather and Rubber Section, Bureau of Foreign and
Domestic Commerce.
II
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immediate effect in driving down rubber price. Prom the
middle of 1924 prices rose slowly but steadily until July
1925, when a high of $1.23 per pound was reached. This
price, brought about by misunderstanding of British inten-
tions relative to the release of rubber in the event of a
run- away market, was short-lived and rubber quotations de-
clined steadily and rapidly through 1926 (see page 59).
Prom that time until February 1928, when the Stevenson
scheme terminated, prices were more or less stable.
The reasons for the widely fluctuating prices
were many, vsJied and somewhat complicated. For example,
British interests accused American users of organizing to
p\ir chase large quantities of rubber to deliberately force
down prices. The British were accused, and not without
reason, of attempting to pay off their war debts through
the medium of rubber, Winston Churchill, who was then
Secretary of State for the Colonies, early in the history
of restriction, declared "One of the principal means of
paying the debt to America is in the provision of rubber."
(1)
Regardless of these reasons, certain aspects of
the demand situation brought about the high price of $1.23
per pound in J\ily 1925. General prosperity in the United
States not only stimulated the demand for automobiles and
1. Speech before the Rubber Growers* Association,
London, 1922
iI
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tlrea but for all types of rubber goods as well. The
development of the balloon tire, requiring 30^ more rub-
ber than the cord tire likewise increased the demand for
crude rubber,
G. Effect of the Stevenson Restriction
Plan on American Rubber Industry
There can be little doubt that the Stevenson Act
cost the American public many millions of dollars, Herbert
Hoover, Secretary of Commerce in 1925, estimated that the
cost of our annual imports at the prices then prevailing
subtracted from the alleged "fair price" of 36 cents for
rubber was $700,000,000 in excess of what it should have
been for the year,(l)
The worst evil to the American manufacturer how-
ever was inherent in the widely fluctuating stocks and
prices. The disparity in costs to large users buying well
in advance and small users buying from hand to mouth could
not help but result in financial distress. Figures of the
B\ireau of Census show a decline in the number of establish-
ments engaged in the manufacture of tires from 178 in 1921
to 160 in 1923, 125 in 1926 and 109 in 1927. The trend was
due to failure and consolidation.
1. Foreign Combination to Control Prices of Raw Materials
,
Dept. of Commerce, Bulletin 385, Washington, D,C.,
Feb. 1926, p. 32.
9
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H, Failure of the Stevenson Restriction Plan
The major weakness of the Stevenson Restriction
Plan may be attributed to Its Inelasticity. This arose
out of the provision that the exportable quota could be
increased by not more than 10% of standard production at
quarterly Intervals, based on the pivotal price of rubber.
The effectiveness of this means of reducing price fluctu-
ations was, therefore, seriously hampered by the slowness
with which changes could be placed into operation. This
feature was somewhat improved by later modifications of
the exportable quota.
The fact that the restrictions applied only to
British planters who represented but 655^ of the world*
s
production also proved a serious handicap. With the in-
creased prices which resulted during the earlier phases of
restriction, native production and Eiiropean planting were
stepped up, particularly in the Netherlands East Indies.
By the time the Stevenson Plan was terminated in November
1928, British control of world rubber production had de-
creased to approximately 55%, (1)
Because it proved Incapable of long-time success,
applying as it did to only British plantations and pemit-
tlng continued planting outside British control, the
Stevenson Restriction Plan was abandoned on November 1,
1928.
I. India Rubber World, February 1929, p. 210.
\
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I , Need for New Measures Realized In 1955 In
mhlch Dutch Interests Could Participate
The advancing prices which resulted from restric-
tion and an increasing demand for crude rubber by the auto-
motive industry gave tremendous impetus to additional plant
ing outside British possessions, including also native and
wild rubber production. The strengthening of the Dutch
position during the time the plan was operative is clearly
reflected by the following figures:
TABLE 13
RUBBER PRODUCTION
Per Cent of World Total
1921 1928
British Malaya 57.5^ 48^
Netherlands East Indies 25.5 33
All others 17 19
Source: U. S. Tariff Commission Report, Nov. 1939, p. 36.
These figures reveal a fundamental fact in rela-
tion to all restrictive plans and that is that unless re-
striction can be made effective over the entire field the
high prices which result may stimulate over-production and
thereby make a bad situation worse.
The end of this first attempt at government re-
striction was followed within two years by a world-wide
9
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depression. Rubber in June 1952 sold for as little as
2^ cents per pound (see chart, page 68A) . Minor fluctua-
tions took place between then and March 1924 but contin-
ually "low" prices eventually led to the adoption of the
International Rubber Regulation Agreement, The need for
new restrictive measures was realized by British and Dutch
planters alike.
J« International Rubber Regulation Agreement
On April 29, 1934, the International Rubber
Regulation Agreement was announced as a plan to regulate
the plantation rubber industry for the period June 1, 1954
to December 51, 1958. A later agreement provides for the
extension of the plan until December 51, 1945.
Unlike the Stevenson Restriction Plan, the
International Rubber Regulation Agreement, as the name
implies, included other than British rubber plantations;
chiefly the Netherlands East Indies. It also gave recog-
nition to the consumers of rubber as evidenced by the fol-
lowing:
"The International Rubber Regulation Committee
shall be empowered to, and shall within one month
after the date of its first meeting, arrange for
the nomination of four persons representative of
the consumers of rubber, of whom two shall be rep-
resentative of such consumers in America, and such
representatives shall form a panel who will be in-
voked to tender advice from time to time to the
International Rubber Regulation Committee as to
I
66
world stocks, the fixing and varying of the
quotas, new planting, replanting, and cognate
matters affecting the interests of rubber con-
sumers. (1)
The basic quotas assigned were:
than the Stevenson Restriction Plan is evidenced by the
fact that the Committee has been able to adjust the allow-
able exports to changes in demand. Since the agreement be-
came effective, the quantity of rubber released has varied
from 455^ to 100% of the basic quotas. In September 1939
the Committee increased permissible exports from 60% to 70%
of the basic quotas. The quota for the Isst quarter was 80%»
1. Excerpt from the International Rubber Regulation
Agreement
.
Source: The Rubber Industry Study , Division of Review,
Washington, D. C, February 1936, p. 92.
Percentage of
World Total
British Malaya
Netherlands East Indies
Other coimtries
48^
33^
That this latter plan has been much more flexible
r
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TABLE 14
BASIC QUOTAS FIXED AS PERMISSIBLE
EXPORTABLE AMOUNT (1)
1§35 1936 1937 1938 1939 1940
P e r c e n t a 6 e
1st Quarter
(Jan, to March) 75 60 75 70 50 50
2nd Quarter
(Apr. to June) 70 60 80 60 50 80
3rd Quarter
(July to Sept.
)
65 65 90 45 60 80
4th Quarter
(Oct . to Dec.
)
60 65 90 45 75 80
Average ^74 62t B3i S5 60
It would seem evident from these figures that prior to the
actual outbreak of war with Japan, end the imminent danger
to rubber plantation in the Par East, the Committee had no
intention of abandoning restriction although, on the other
hand, they were equally desirous of preventing a shortage
of stocks.
Opinion regarding the International Rubber
Regulation Agreement would seem to be divided. On the one
side are those who were glad to have it in effect, as it
has permitted the piirchase of crude rubber at a more stabil-
ized cost and has removed, to a certain degree, the specula-
tion on inventories. On the other side there are others who
have a natural dislike for and distrust in all regulatory
devices
.
1. Ibid.
, p. 95
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To properly evaluate the adequacy of this second
regulatory plan It is necessary to compare It with the pre-
ceding measure.
The Stevenson Restriction Plan embraced the British
Empire end included approximately only 65% of the world» s
total rubber production in 1922 and but 55% in 1928 (see
page 62). By contrast the International Rubber Regulation
Agreement embraces 9&% of total world rubber production.
Greater inclusiveness
,
therefore, permitting wider control
is a primary factor in this second restrictive measure.
The Stevenson Restriction Plan utilized a pivotal
price whereas the International Rubber Regulation Agreement
has en arbitrary control through the International Rubber
Regulation Committee which has been given wide discretion-
ary powers. In this way inelasticity, one of the failing
factors in the Stevenson Restriction Plan, has been avoided.
New Plantings, replantings and the export of plant-
ing materials which were not recognized in the first restric-
tion plan are controlled with the result that over-produc-
tion is not easily accomplished imder the International
Rubber Regulation Agreement,
Perhaps the greatest advantage in the second con-
trol measure, however, is the recognition of Anerican man-
\ifacturing interests in the Manijifactiirers * Advisory panel
to the International Rubber Regulation Committee.
I
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While prices have fluctuated since this second
regulatory device became operative in June 1934, increas-
ing almost 100^ between May 1955 and June 1937 (see Chart C
the fluctuations have not been anywhere so wide flung or so
severe on the consumers and producers of rubber. The
International Rubber Regulation Agreement has permitted the
purchase of crude rubber at a more stabilized cost and has
removed to a certain degree the speculation on inventories.
Whether the International Rubber Regulation
Agreement will be continued after 1943 is © matter of con-
jecture. If it is not, it would seem that some form of
regulatory device is necessary to stabilize rubber prices
through the control of rubber stocks placed on the market.
Such unique economic factors in the rubber indus-
try as inelasticity of demand for manufactured rubber goods,
inelasticity of supply (the long period necessary before
rubber trees can be tapped) and the large number of native
producers, when allowed free rein result in wide price
fluctuations for the purchasers and producers of rubber;
therefore, some form of regulation is necessary.
If a general feeling of confidence in the rubber
market is to be maintained in the future, it must be done
by removing the fear of rapid unloading of stocks. This,
it would seem, can only be accomplished through a regu-
latory measure which embraces a unified control over the
export of rubber by producing companies and a unified con-
trol of rubber imports
.
I
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CHAPTER V
EFFORTS MADE BY AMERICAN INDUSTRY TO
OVERCOME ITS DEPENDENCY UPON OTHER
NATIONS FOR SUPPLIES OP RUBBER
Except for military consideration, up \intil 1922,
there did not appear to be any soiand reason why America
was not safe in allowing the plantation industry to de-
velop along logical economic lines, as it had in the past,
substantially in the hands of foreign interests.
A, Harvey Firestone Pioneer of Campaign
"Americans Should Grow Their Own Rubber
"
Until 1922, at any rate, American rubber manufac-
turers displayed little apprehension over the workings of
the Stevenson plan. The American industrial leader against
restriction, Harvey J. Firestone, Sr., fought the law from
the first day it was passed by the British Colonial govern-
ments in the Far East with the declaration
•l am going to fight this law with ell the
strength and vigor that is in me. I do not be-
lieve that for the benefit of a few stockholders
any government has the moral right to make a law
restricting the output of a product of the soil
so universally used as rubber. "(1)
A one-man campaign began. American industry, secure in
the belief that the law was a necessary evil to insure a
supply and keep the British rubber plantations from
1. Speech to Business Associates, Nov. 2, 1922, Akron,
Ohio.
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bankruptcy, was at first inclined to look on Harvey
Firestone as a man with a personal axe to grind.
Slowly, however, realization came thct British
rubber manufacturers, also other British industries, were
not altogether satisfied with the measures imposed by the
Stevenson Restriction scheme. Harvey Firestone* s campaign
was formulated to focus attention on the fact that the plan
was essentially a scheme by which rubber plantation owners
had persuaded their government to secure artifically high
prices for rubber instead of relying on drastic cuts in op-
erating costs, as other industries had found necessary in
trying to get out from \mder during the 1921 depression.
B. Department of Commerce* s Studies Began in July
1925 with a View to Developing Adequate Supplies
of Rubber under American Control
Firestone's untiring efforts which led him to
Washington brought results in the form of an appropriation
of $500,000 for the survey of possible rubber producing
areas in the Philippines and South America by the Depart-
ment of Commerce and Department of Agriculture.
The areas suitable for growing rubber, particu-
larly Hevea, were of course limited geographically. Fur-
ther limitations were placed in the governmental quest for
new areas as it was also necessary to avoid regions whose
possible restrictions or manipulations could take piece.
This centered the search on territories subject to (1)
iI
i
1
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American control or (2) to territories under the American
flag or (3) to Brazil. In view of the Brazilian fin&n-
cial coups of 1905-1906 and 1909-1910 it is perhaps dif-
ficult to appreciate why the Amazon Valley received con-
sideration at all. It was, however, the "home" of Hevea.
And, apparently, it was believed that Brazil, which as a
rubber factor was then no longer important, had learned
her lesson -- efforts to manipulate prices had serious
repercussions to supplies and purchasers alike.
Scientific studies of the possibility of devel-
oping supplies of rubber under American control in three
areas were begun July 1, 1925 by the Department of
Commerce from the funds provided by Congressional Act,
The results of these studies (1) were published
by the Department of Commerce in 1925 and all urged
American independence in rubber production by the estab-
lishment of plantations in recommended areas within the
regions surveyed.
There could be no doubt about the suitability of
climate and soil conditions in Brazil and in the Middle
Eastern areas. This had already been proven. Eminently
suitable climate and soil conditions were likewise found
in the Philippines. Labor and land laws, however,
1. Vance - Muzzall - Bushnell - Baldwin, Possibilities
of Para Rubber Production in the Philippines ; Figart,
David M., The Plantation Industry in the Middle East ;
Schurz - Hargls - Marbut - Manifold, Rubber Production
in the Amazon Valley : Trade Promotion Series Nos. 17,
2 and 23, U. S. Dept. of Commerce, Bureau of Foreign
and Domestic Commerce, Washington, 1925.
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presented an obstacle that could not be overcome although
the growing of rubber would have meant millions of dollars
for the Islands.
Shortage of low-priced labor and governmental in-
security also discouraged investment in Brazil.
The results of these surveys from the viewpoint
of production of rubber under American control were decid-
edly disappointing. They did, however, supplement and sup-
port investigations that were made by a limited number of
large American manufacturing concerns interested in estab-
lishing an all-American rubber supply.
C. Rubber Planting in Tropical Areas under
American Control Began by Private Industry
The motives which led American manufacturers into
the rubber plantation business were, of course, many and
varied but there can be little doubt that primarily they
were influenced by widely fluctuating prices. Something
had to be done to stabilize the price of a coimnodity that
could change, as rubber did, from $1.25 to 2^ cents a pound
within the course of ten years, involving in the process
millions of dollars in inventory loss.
Although little was accomplished by American rub-
ber manufacturers In supplying their own rubber prior to
the Stevenson Restriction Plan, one concern, the United
States Rubber Company, announced the control of its ovm
r
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raw material as an objective as far back as 1892. (1) By
1913 it had acquired extensive holdings in Sumatra and
developed in the process the world's largest rubber plan-
tation. In 1917 additional acreage was planted in the
Malay Peninsula, By the end of 1941 the United States
Rubber Company had 132,000 acres of rubber land in the
Netherlands East Indies and British Malaya of which 99,000
acres were in bearing. These provide about one-fifth of
the company's average rubber needs. (2)
Following the plan initiated by the United States
Rubber Company, the Goodyear Tire and Rubber Company also
had acquired land in the Dutch East Indies by 1917, prior
to the Stevenson Restriction Plan becoming operative.
Vlhile the holdings were not as large as those of the
United States Rubber Company, the Goodyear Tire and Rubber
Company, in 1939, had 94,000 acres in the Netherland East
Indiescof which 60,000 acres are in bearing. (3) These pro-
vide approximately 12^% of the companies' rubber require-
ments.
D. The Firestone Plantations in Liberia
As the leader of the opposition against British
dominance in the rubber producing industry, Harvey S.
Firestone, Sr., of the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company,
1. Depew, CM. Ed., One Hundred Years of American Commerce
,
New York, 1895, Vol. II, "American Rubber Manufacturers"
by Charles L. Johnson, pp. 498-504,
2. Wall Street Journal, Sept. 19, 1939, p. 2.
3. Standard Statistics, 1939.
I
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Investigated the possibility of growing rubber in many
parts of the world, including the Philippines, Malaya,
Sarawak and Sumatra, Java and Ceylon.
After months of research ending in 1926, Liberia,
on the west coast of Africa, was selected as the best pos-
sible location. Rainfall and humidity, so necessary for
the growth of rubber trees, were suitable. An adequate
labor supply was also at hand. Satisfactory negotiations,
however, were not readily concluded with the Liberian
Government, Without detailing the various steps which led
to the final agreement, difficulties with regard to a pro-
posed loan to the Republic of Liberia, to be made by the
United States Government at first and then by the New York
bankers, arose to stand in the way of a speedy understand-
ing. Eventually all difficulties were ironed out and a
mutually satisfactory agreement placed into operation. By
it the Firestone interests acquired a 90-year lease of one
million acres of land and a lease of further acres, known
as the Mount Barclay Rubber Plantation, which had been
abandoned by a British company.
In exchange for these rights, among other things
the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company agreed to improve the
harbor at Monrovia, pay a rent of six cents per acre and a
tax on rubber and other exports, amounting to 1% of the
selling price in New York.
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In 1927 and 1928 approximately 30,000 acres had
been planted. The Mount Barclay plantation resiimed pro-
duction in 1926 and has produced considerable volume each
year since.
Today the Firestone Tire and Rubber Company has
67,000 acres of planted rubber in Liberia but still only
approximately 30,000 acres of matured trees. This company
obtained 1^% of its needs in 1940 from Liberia. (1)
E. Utilization of Guayxile by American Manufacturers
In endeavoring to establish American independence
attention was of course turned to plants growing within the
United States that would produce rubber. Of the many plants
containing rubber so far only one, Guayule, is know that
can be grown in Northern America which will produce rubber
in commercially practicable quantities. The Guayule shrub
grows wild in only one region of the world — southern Texas
and North Central Mexico. Unlike Hevea brasiliensis it is
only about two feet high and silvery grey in appearance.
While the rubber in Hevea is in the latex system and con-
stitutes but a small fraction of 1% of the total weight of
the tree at any one time, in Guayule it is in all the liv-
ing cells except the leaves and, in the better varieties,
amounts to 22^^ of the dry weight of the plant. (2)
1. Standard Statistics, 1940.
2. McCallum, W. B., The Cultivation of Guayule , Oct. 4, 1919,
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Production flgxires on Mexican Guayule are avail-
able from 1905, although it is known that small amounts
were marketed prior to that time. The real beginning of
Guayule may be said to date from 1904 when the Intercon-
tinental Rubber Company undertook to develop the plant,
to provide a source of supply of crude rubber within the
United States and thus establish American rubber indepen-
dence «
Three factories were established in Mexico and
have been in almost continuous operation since. The util-
ization of Guayule by American manufacturers was a contrib-
utory factor in the collapse of the rubber boom in 1910.
Exports by this time had reached 9,542 tons, roughly 10^^
of world production. (1) After 1912, however, Mexican pro-
duction declined due to depressed crude rubber prices and
the fact that output was restricted to prevent extinction
of the plant.
The objective of the Intercontinental Rubber
Company was to replace this diminishing supply of wild
Guayule with that grown on plantations. In 1913 work be-
gan in Valley Center, California, and in 1916 in Southern
Arizona. The two outstanding questions at the time were:
"Could the plant be produced in a practical way on a large
scale?* and '"Could it be made to produce sufficient rubber
under •plantation* or other than »wild» conditions?"
1. McCallum, W. B., "The Cultivation of Guayule," India
Rubber World, October 1, 1941.
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Years of experimentation proved that both ques-
tions could be answered in the affirmative if soil condi-
tions, rainfcill, and temperature were favorable. By 1951
8,000 acres of ^uayule had been set out in California. A
large factory for the extraction of the rubber had just
got under way when the price of rubber dropped to three
cents a pound.
For maximum yields G-uayule is harvested only
every fourth year when it reaches its optimum growth, al-
though two-yea.r uui:yule has produced satisfactory amounts
of rubber. Because the whole plsnt is hi*rvested, it is
necessary to htive u. large area and m succession of plant-
ings to insure continuous harvesting.
The method of extraction is mechanical; that is,
the pl&nts are ground up and macerated in a pebble mill.
The rubber pc=Lrticles gatner into small lumps which can be
separated from the powdered woody materi&l by flotation in
water
.
Rubber obtained from Gu^yule has the srjne chem-
ical composition as that from Hevea, It has a high resin
content, however, which up to the present time has confined
its use principally to the mtnuf actui''e of rubberized fabrics
and blending with imported Hevea rubber. Once deresinated,
however, Guayule compares favorably in quality vcith imported
Hevea. It is believed that under mass production methods.
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to which Guayule is readily adaptable, rubber could be pro-
duced In the United States from this cultivated plant and
deresinated at a total cost of 35^ a pound. (1) Rubber pro-
duced in Mexico from wild rubber has in recent months been
quoted at 13^ a poiind. This, however, is not deresinated.
More than any other plant Guayule, by investiga-
tion, shows that it meets the climatic, agricultural and
mechanical requirements essential to its successful devel-
opment in the United States and in the light of present
world conditions is destined to play a role of Increasing
Importance in our economy,
P. Edison Botanical Research Corporation
Interested in the campaign started by his friend,
Harvey S. Firestone, Sr., "America Should Produce Its Own
Rubber," (2) Thomas A Edison, the great Inventor, lent his
scientific knowledge and some of the last years of his life
to the cause of rubber. His idea was that if a plant could
be found, growing on American soil, which would produce
rubber of commercial utility partial, if not entire, eco-
nomic Independence might be achieved. The Edison Bontanlcal
Research Corporation was organized with this objective and
to conduct the experlements Involved in analyzing native
1, U. S. Tariff Commission, Crude Rubber
,
Washington, D. C,
Nov. 1939.
2, Firestone, Harvey S., America Should Produce Its Own
Rubber, Akron 1923.
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American shrubs, trees and plants* Between 1925 and 1931
approximately 15,000 plants were tested. This figure as
the work progressed was narrowed down to 4,000 to 600 and
then to 40, by planting experiments; then finally, to gol-
denrod alone. (1) By cross breeding, Edison research chem-
ists developed a goldenrod twelfe feet high with a six to
seven per cent rubber content. There is record that in
1930 Thomas A. Edison patented a process for extracting
the rubber from the plant.
Because the work done by Edison Botanical Research
Corporation was conducted under the supervision of an
American scientist of international reputation, a man ap-
proaching his eightieth year, it is not improbable that the
experiemnts received greater publicity and attention than
might otherwise have been the case had another individual,
less in the public eye, been involved.
While it is true that rubber was and still can be
obtained from the common American goldenrod plant, Guayule,
the Mexican shrub, is so much better from the viewpoint of
cultivation, cost and processing that there is no compari-
son between the two.
G. Henry Ford»s Brazilian Plantation
The reasons which prompted the Ford organization
Into the rubber plantation business are somewhat difficult
1. Indian Rubber World, March 1932.
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to determine. On the face of it, it does not seem probable
that the Ford Motor Company could manufacture its tires
cheaper than they could be purchased. Even if this were
so it seems unlikely that the chief ingredient — rubber —
could be produced for less than the piirchasing price of
crude rubber from an already existing British plantation.
The acquisition of 7800 square miles in Brazil in 1925, how-
ever, was in keeping with the Ford tradition of control, as
far as possible, over the crude materials entering into the
manufacture of Ford cars* Actual work in the Ford planta-
tion in the Tapajos River region of Brazil did not get under
way until 1928. From the figures available today it is evi-
dent that large-scale rubber development has not been pos-
sible. Only 20,000 acres are under actual cultivation
which, of course, supply a very small portion of Ford req-
uisites. The records show planting trouble, tapping trouble
and, worst of all, labor trouble. The Amazonian native. If
Ford Company plantation reports are typical, just doesn»t
care for steady routine work.
H. Pooled Buying of Crude Rubber
Another expedient aimed at the British monopoly
of supply was the formation of a cooperative buying pool
among American manufacturers to prevent buyers bidding
against each other. A combine, formed in December 1926,
consisted of such leading tire and automobile manufacturers
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as United States Rubber Company, Goodrich, Goodyear, General
Motors Corporation, Packard Motors, Studebaker and others.
The pool, emounting to #40,000,000, was organized for the
purpose of stabilizing rubber prices and to this end it had
as an objective the acquisition of a reserve of between
25,000 and 50,000 tons of rubber; this to be held in the
United States as a precaution against future price fluctu-
ation* (1)
There is good reason to believe that the pool in
operation \intil March 1928 was a stabilizing force in the
market. Prices during 1927, at any rate, did not fluctuate
to a marked degree. Losses of nearly $20,000,000, however,
were alleged to have been uncovered in the effort to stabi-
lize prices (2) and by August, 1928 the combine was liqui-
dated.
I. Utilization of Reclaim Rubber Stocks
Reclaimed rubber is the product which develops
after vulcanized rubber has been subjected to a "reclaim-
ing" process. A reclaiming process, however, is not vulcan-
ization in reverse. Such a process does, nevertheless,
transform a tough non-plastic article, such as a rubber
tire, by removing cotton and eliminating free or uncombined
sulphur into a soft, workable mass that can be mixed like
crude rubber and successfully vulcanized again.
1, Indie Rubber World, December 1926, p. 30.
2, Whittlesey, C, K, , Governmental Control of Crude Rubber
,
Princeton University Press, p. 160.
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Up until 1889 a series of what at best may be
termed semi-successful attempts were made by rubber chem-
ists and technologists to reincarnate "old" rubber. The
processes developed, however, were for the most part un-
economical when compared with the price of "new" rubber
or the results obtained did not show upon analysis proper
segregation of rubber from such foreign elements as cotton,
free sulphur or sand.
In 1889 Lt. Col. Chapman Mitchell developed an
acid process which proved effective in converting old boots
and shoes into satisfactory reclaim. The process involved
the heating of ground scrap with sulphuric or hydrochloric
acid under pressure. In this way the destruction of the
fibrous material was accomplished, the rubber plasticlzed
or made soft and the free sulphur and acid soluable pig-
ments removed. This process, unfortunately, did not prove
effective in converting hose, belting or tire scrap.
It was not until the development of Arthur H.
Marks' had been perfected, in 1899, that it was possible
to obtain acceptable reclaim rubber from these grades of
scrap. In the more than forty years that have elapsed
since then, Arthur Marks' alkali process is the one by
which today by far the greatest amount of scrap rubber is
reclaimed. By the alkali process, finely divided scrap
1
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is heated with a caustic soda solution at an established
pressure. This results in freeing the scrap from the fib-
rous material. The action thereafter is the same as in
the acid process. The rubber is plasticized and free sul-
phur and alkali soluable pigments are dissolved.
The popular conception of reclaim is that it is
a cheap and Inferior material used by none too scrupulous
manufacturers to Increase their profits at the expense of
the consi^ming public. Nothing could be further from the
truth. For rneny purposes reclaim rubber possesses all the
necessary properties of crude rubber. For other purposes,
involving exposure to light and weather, it is more dur-
able and vastly better than crude rubber. Among other
things the use of reclaim rubber has brought about a sav-
ing in mixing time and costs and also a decrease in the
time of cure, resulting in savings which have reduced the
price of the finished article.
More important than this, however, is the economic
value reclaim rubber may rightfully claim. The utilization
of "used" rubber through the process of reel aiming is an
economic echievement that will undoubtedly greatly assist
the rubber manufacturing industry and offset, in part, the
curtailment of imports of crude rubber due to present war
conditions
.
I
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Analysis of the figures shown in Table 15 shows
that as the price of crude rubber has fluctuated so has
the proportion of reclaim rubber used by the American
rubber manufacturing industry.
In 1925 the price of crude rubber averaged approx-
imately 72^ cents per pound and in the same year the rates
of consumption of reclaim to crude was Z>5.Z>%* Beginning at
that time until 1932 the price of crude rubber dropped con-
tinuously. However, the rates of consumption increased to
a maximum in 1927 and 1928 when in the later year the price
of crude rubber dropped to 22^ cents per pound. Beginning
at that time the ratio decreased until 1933 when it was low
at 205^. (See Chart D)
While in recent years the quantity of reclaim rub-
ber processed has averaged around 140,000 tons, it will be
noticed that In 1928 223,000 tons were produced.
That reclaim is of tremendous importance and a
necessity in our economy is forcibly demonstrated by the
fact that articles made from it age well. It is just stiff
enough in unvulcanlzed condition to simplify the man\if ac-
turing of many articles.
Reclaimed rubber Is not used where "high tensile"
strengths are required any more than pure crude rubber is
used where resistance to abrasion is desired. It is, how-
ever, particularly well adapted to the manufacture of such
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articles as rubber heels, rubber boots, galoshes, rubber
bumpers, etc.
That reclaim has been used in sizeable quantities,
even during times of low-priced crude rubber, would indi-
cate that its value in production is almost as great as
that of virgin crude rubber.
As a factor in helping American manufacturers to
offset high prices due to virtual British monopoly of the
supply of crude, it has carved out a place all its own.
1I
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TABLE 15
ESTIMATED UNITED STATES CONSUMPTION OF
CRUDE AND RECLAIMED RUBBER
New York
Crude Reclaimed % Reclaimed Price
Year Rubber Rubber to Crude Standard
Sheets
1919 202,303 (tons) 73,535 (tons) 36.3% 48.7jr per lb.
36.31920 195, 270 75, 297 38,4
1921 169, 308 41 , 351 ^ A A24 .4 16.4
19 • d 1 ' . O
1925 319,700 75,200 23.5 29.5
1924 328,769 78,500 23.9 26.2
1925 388,481 137,000 35.3 72.5
1926 366,168 164,500 44.9 48.5
1927 373,000 189 , 500 50.8 37.7
1928 437,000 223,000 51.0 22.5
1929 467,400 217,000 46.4 20.6
1930 378,000 153,500 40.8 12.0
1931 355,193 123,000 34.6 6.2
1932 336,738 77,500 23.0 3.5
1933 412,365 85,000 20.6 6.0
1934 462,480 100,855 31.8 12.9
1935 491,544 117,523 23.9 12.4
1936 575,000 133,000 23.1 16.4
1937 543,600 162,000 29.8 19.4
1938 438,000 120,800 27*6 14.6
1939 592,000 170,000 28.7
1940 618,349 187,090 30.3
Barker, P. W., Rubber Industry of the United States
,
United States Dept. of Commerce, 1839-1940, p. 24.
1
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J, The C^ueat for Synthetic Rubber
American chemists have made enumerable experi-
ments to discover a method of producing synthetic rubber
at a price to compete with crude. The forces which have
stimulated the search have, of course, been both economic
and nationalistic. A rubber substitute that would make
the United States economically free of the Middle East and
other foreign countries and prevent recurrent price swings
would go far toward establishing American rubber indepen-
dence. As far as finding a complete substitute for rubber
the search has been unsuccessful. The quest for an artifi-
cial rubber has, however, produced many synthetic organic
substances technically superior for specific uses.
(1) Synthetic Rubber Background
Practically every substance known to man has been
used by chemists in the effort to reproduce rubber. The
approach to the problem was clarified when Michael Faraday,
English chemist, discovered the chemical composition of
natural rubber in 1826. Greville Williams, in 1860, iso-
lated the products present in crude rubber, discovering in
the process "isoprene.* Historically this was of great
importance for isoprene, or some of its close relatives,
are the basis of practically all rubber substitutes. A
Frenchman, Gustave Bouchardat, changed isoprene to a
I
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rubber-like substance in 1879. Therefore, as long ago as
sixty years it was felt that but one step separated re-
searchers from a satisfactory and commercially practicable
synthetic rubber.
An international race for rubber substitutes de-
veloped between English and German chemists, beginning in
1909 when Drs. Fritz Hoffman and Carl Coutelle produced
isoprene from para-cresol, a coal tar fraction. In 1910,
in England, Dr. Francis E. Matthews found that sodium
metal caused isoprene to polymerize readily.
The manufacture of isoprene was begiin in Germany
on a small scale in 1910. Because of difficulties involved
in production, however, German chemists turned to methyl
isoprene, which they found could be readily produced from
acetone with the help of aluminum.
The World War gave further impetus to synthetic
rubber experimentation, particularly in Germany, cut off
from crude rubber by the blockade, but there is no record
of an improved method of production. Again in the 1920'
s
when the Stevenson Restriction Plan became operative,
American and German industrial concerns resumed the quest
for a suitable rubber substitute. Between 1920 and 1930
the E. I. DuPont de Nemours Company took over the commer-
cial development of the monovinyl acetylene discovery made
by Julius A. Nieuwland, Professor of Organic Chemistry at
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Notre Dame University, In the meantime, German chemists
have developed their artificial Biina rubbers.
(2) Types of Synthetic Rubber
Generally speaking synthetic rubber, produced in
America, may be classified under three groupings: (1)
Neoprene types, (2) Butadiene types and (3) Polysulfide
rubbers. These three types differ in the variety of raw
materials from which they are derived and in the applica-
tion of the kind of artificial rubber which they produce.
Polysulfide rubber articles, for example, are unsuited for
tires and other products that must withstand severe mechan-
ical stresses or high temperatures. They are, however,
good for such industrial applications as hose, gaskets,
and a wide variety of other mechanical goods. •
The high resistance of Butadiene rubber to heat
makes it particularly effective in the manufacture of non-
swelling packing material, tank hose, paint spraying hose,
and conveyors of oily materials. Its tensile strength
permits its use for balloon fabrics and in conveyor belts
for sharp edged materials. Because of special aging qual-
ities it is particularly effective in the production of
stoppers, special packings and rubberized protective
clothing.
9
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Neoprene likewise has a special place In Industry.
Unusual resistance to heat, sunlight, oils, gases and acids
make it readily adaptable to a variety of articles for which
crude rubber cannot be used.
(3) United States Production of Synthetic Rubber
Production of synthetic rubber in the United
States in recent years has been decidedly small when com-
pared with imports of crude. While in all fairness it can
be said that through experimentation a product having better
qualities than rubber, for special purposes, has resulted,
it is extremely doubtful if synthetic rubber will ever be
produced at a price to compete with crude rubber.
TABLE 16
PRODUCTION OP SYNTHETIC RUBBER -
UNITED STATES (LONG TONS) (1)
Neoprene Butadiene
Types
Polysulfide
Rubber
1939 1750 None 500
1940 2500 60 700
1941 (est.) 6300 4000 1400
While the foregoing figures indicate that progress
in the development of synthetic rubber has been slow, and
the lack of certain figures indicate that it has not been
of commercial Importance, there is good reason to believe
1. India Rubber World, November 1941, p. 168
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that the foundation for future expansion has been properly-
laid. (See pages 101 to 105.
)
I
CHAPTER VI
NEW PROBLEIAS FACING AMERICAN
RUBBER INDUSTRY TODAY
The present war with Japan has revived suddenly
and with shocking reality a danger In relation to our
national economy America's dependency on other nations
for supplies of crude rubber. Today 50% of the world's
natural rubber originates In English plantations In the
Middle East, 38^ In the adjoining Dutch Colonies, &% In
other Middle East countries and only 4% In Africa and In
the southern part of this hemisphere.
With the attack on Pearl Harbor, on December 7,
1941, and the successes of the Japanese army In British
Malaya and the Netherlands East Indies, America has had
to face the fact that exports of crude rubber from this
all-Important area will stop altogether for an Indefinite
period of time.
Something like 30,000 products are now manufactured
of rubber. It Is a strategic war material. Modern armies
roll on It, Open sea lanes, therefore, across the Pacific
to the concentrated sources of rubber are as essential as
the transatlantic routes. Rubber was one of the first In-
dustries to be given attention by the National Defense
Advisory Commission in 1940, and last year (1941) was the
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first placed under full government control, without any
actual existing shortage*
Late in 1939 the United States government, realiz-
ing that the rubber-producing countries in the Middle East
were the only sources which could supply our immediate
needs, began building an emergency government rubber stock-
pile, a policy which was continued steadily throughout the
past two years. At the outset of 1941 this emergency stock'
pile of crude rubber was 134,000 long tons, by October 1941
(the latest month for which statistics were made available)
the stock-pile had increased 266,000 tons.(l) In this time
stocks in the hands of producers moved from 175,000 to
189,000 tons. In October, 1941, therefore, there was a
definite and known crude rubber inventory of 445,000 tons
on hand. Since then stocks have probably further expanded.
Estimates of total crude rubber on hand and afloat, includ-
ing all stock in the hands of the government, as of Jan. 1,
1942, were placed between 600,000 to 750,000 long tons. (2)
The Rubber Reserve Corporation, the agency through which
the purchase was made, was not successful in accumulating
an inventory of the size desired, nor was the rubber in-
dustry itself any more successful. In a normal business
year 600,000 to 750,000 tons would be adequate for a twelve
1. Survey of Current Business, January 1942.
2. Rubber Age
,
January 1942, p. 279
i
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month period. In 1940 consumption was 648,500 tons. In
1939 rubber consiamption almost reached 592,000 tons but
during 1941, the highest in history, an estimated 800,000
tons were consumed. With the inevitable increased demand
for rubber products resulting from defense as well as es-
sential civilian needs, the reserve accumulated by the
Rubber Reserve Corporation, in the face of existing condi-
tions, is et best no more than a year*s supply.
The position as of January 1, 1942 reflected a
stock-pile of between 600,000 and 750,000 tons of rubber
on hand; meantime, the then existing possibility of no
further supplies of rubber from the Middle East until the
end of the war, has become a realization. How long the
war will last is, naturally, a matter of conjecture.
The seriousness of the rubber situation as it af-
fects the American consumer has all developed since the
beginning of 1942. The impact was first and probably most
seriously felt when tires, tubes and passenger cars were
placed on a rationing basis. While it is still possible
to purchase automobiles and new tires, the quotas which
have been assigned to the various state, city and town
rationing boards are designed to fulfill the essential
needs of operators of vehicles on an eligible classifica-
tion list. Briefly this means that unless a prospective
{
purchaser performs some service essential to the welfare
of the general public or the furtherance of the war pro-
gram he Is Ineligible. The average pleasure riding motor
1st, therefore, is In an imhappy position where he bids
fair to remain for some time into the future.
For a brief period the American motorist was
heartened by the possibility of having his tires recapped
with camelback, but effective February 15, 1942, this, to
was placed under rigid control. As a result of these re-
strictions, the American consumer is aware, as probably
never before, of his dependence on a material rubber -
which originates far beyond the shores of the United
States
.
There can be little doubt that the rubber situ-
ation is serious to consumer and manufacturer alike. The
rubber Industry now faces problems that hitherto existed
in theory or, if considered at all, only as remote and un
likely possibilities.
Effective measures to correct the situation and
at the same time protect one of America's essential Indus
tries are, of course, indicated. Some were instituted
prior to the outbreak of the war, some are now in opera-
tion and others are in process of being perfected. These
measures may be grouped as follows:
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(a) Accumulation of government reserve
and curtailment in the use of
present supplies of rubber.
(b) Increased production of synthetic rubber.
(c) Increased use of reclaim rubber.
(d) Governmental development of rubber
production in the Western Hemisphere,
(e) Increase in the production of Guayule.
(f ) Changes in compounding,
(1) Accumulation of Government Reserve and
Curtailment in the Use of Present Supplies
of Rubber
To accvimulate a larger reserve of crude rubber
for use under emergency conditions, and not because of any
lack of supplies at the time, all rubber imported into the
United States was placed in a preferred list as of June 20,
1941. The Priorities Division of the Office of Production
Management on that date issued General Preference Order No,
M-15, which covers the conservation of the supply and di-
rection of the distribution of rubber (the rationing of
rubber to manufacturers). Almost coincident with this
measure an announcement was made by the Federal Loan
Administrator, Jesse Jones, that the Rubber Reserve Company
would become the sole buyer for crude rubber exported to
the United States from the Far East, The purpose of this
action was, of coiu*se, to speed the accumulation of the
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Grovernment s reserve supply and to facilitate distribution
to the rubber manufacturing industry for defense and com-
mercial requirements in accordance with such "'quotes'^ as
might be determined by the Office of Production Management.
The quota established for the industry in June,
1941, permitted the processing of rubber, not to exceed
the following percentage of "average" monthly consiunption
during the twelve months' period beginning April 1, 1940
and ending March 51, 1941;
July 99^
August 94%
September 89%
October 84^
November 82%
December 80%
General Preference Order M-15, which embodies these quotas,
further provided that a processor who consumed less than his
quota in a given month might add the amount so unconsumed to
any subsequent quota or quotas. Provisions were also made
for the allocation of rubber to expedite deliveries under
defense orders.
By a supplemental order, M-15- A, companies were
alternatively permitted to operate during July at 80% of
their J-une, 1941 rate, instead of 99^ of the average rate
during the base period, noted above.
General Preference Order M-15 and M-15-A were
issued and placed into operation before the attack on
I
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Pearl Harbor, December 7, 1941. With the actual outbreak
of war with Japan, however, and the Imminent danger to the
plantation areas in the Far East, speedy and drastic steps
were taken to conserve the stocks of crude rubber in the
United States.
The War Production Board issued a comprehensive
amendment to the general conservation order, mentioned
above, on January 23, 1942 under which many products f smil-
iar to the average citizen may disappear. At that time it
was established that such products as bathing suits and
caps, erasers, toys and novelties, lawn and garden hose,
trouser belts, combs, golf and tennis balls and other sport-
ing goods, heels for ordinary footwear, household aprons,
goods made from sponge rubber and other products of non-
essential character could be made in the future only from
reclaimed rubber.
A further control measure became effective on
February 1, 1942 (Amendment 5 to General Preference Order
M-15-b). This order issued by the War Production Board
sets forth the uses for which rubber and latex will be
made available to processors. Except to fill strictly
war orders the use of rubber is restricted each month be-
ginning February 1, 1942 to certain percentages of average
monthly consumption during the twelve months ended March 1,
1941.
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In certain cases, such as the manufacturers of
all types of tires, casings and tubes and for the retread-
ing and recapping materials, specific permission to use
crude rubber or latex must be obtained from the War
Production Board,
In addition to filling war orders, rubber may be
consiamed each month for such general purposes as appear
in the Amendment under List A, and at stated percentages
of the base period. Illustrative of this list are the fol-
lowing three items, selected at random: (1) essential
heavy industry belting hose and packings, 140 per cent;
(2) rubber footwear for workmen and athletic use, 30 per
cent; (3) plumbers* supplies, 80 per cent.
Without detailing the effect the foregoing regu-
lations have had on the rubber industry, it is apparent
that the object of these governmental rulings has been,
and rightly so, not only to conserve crude rubber but to
confine its use to essential goods and war needs.
A revolutionary change affecting the supply of
rubber would, under normal conditions, have a marked ef-
fect on prices.
As a result of the Rubber Reserve Company becom-
ing the '=sole buyer for crude rubber exported into the
United States," however, the buying price for crude rubber
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continues, until further notice, to te the price estab-
lished by agreement between the Rubber Reserve Company,
the International Rubber Regulation Committee and the
British Ministry of Supply. The domestic price for rub-
ber is fixed by the Rubber Reserve Company, with appropri-
ate differentials according to type and grades. The price
of No. 1-X ribbed smoked sheets, for example, was fixed
at 22^ cents per pound on August 6, 1941.
In consequence of this action, crude rubber spec-
ulation and competitive buying are no longer possible.
Price competition has likewise ceased. The measure also
provides a method whereby the inventory position of all
manufacturing concerns in the United States may be equal-
ized, if as a result of further emergency, it becomes nec-
essary, through limiting the distribution of rubber to
companies without stocks of their own.
As a result of existing conditions and govern-
mental action, the status of the rubber manufacturing in-
dustry has changed, becoming what might be termed a na-
tionally operated public utility. Rubber importers and
traders still do business but on a reduced and more or
less fixed scale. Manufacturers are allotted rubber and
told how much may be processed. All manufacturing con-
cerns are placed in the same position, up to a certain
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point. Beyond that the Government may assign extra rubber
to any firm and, in addition, require from the industry in
general the production of such goods as may be considered
essential for national defense. That this action has been
necessary no one questions, although there are undoubtedly
some who decry governmental intervention, regardless of the
cause.
(2) Increase in the Production of Synthetic Rubber
A study of synthetic rubber production begun by
the Advisory Commission to the Council of National Defense,
in 1940, brought to light the following facts: (1) national
economic safety required the expansion of synthetic rubber
production capacity to 100,000 tons a year; (2) that it
was not financially or economically possible for private
industry to undertake this expansion and (5) Government
assistance was required. The problem was referred to the
Reconstruction Finance Corporation. Concurrently, however,
this same governmental agency was working with manufacturers
through the medium of the Rubber Reserve Company to build up
a large reserve of rubber. This latter method of handling
a then remote possible eventuality was less costly and
seemed more direct than to invest large sums of money in
ej^ensive facilities for the manufacture of synthetic rub-
ber. As a result action leading to the expansion of the
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synthetic rubber industry was deferred until the early part
of 1941, At that time a plan was formulated for the con-
struction of fo\ir plants with individual capacities of
10,000 tons each and equipment installed for an immediate
capacity of 2,500 tons a year. Compared with the actual
needs of industry the present production of synthetic rub-
ber in the United States is hardly significant. Production
figures for 1940 reflected a total of but 4,000 long tons.
The figures for 1941, when published, will probably show
a total of between 15,000 and 20,000 long tons.
Early in June 1941, the stockholders' report of
the Standard Oil Company of New Jersey provided for 15,000
tons of synthetic rubber production for 1942. The Thiokol
Corporation has likewise made plans to increase its produc-
tion from 2,000 to 3,000 tons. Neoprene production (made
from acetylene obtained from coal and limestone and from
hydrochloric acid obtained from salt) it is expected will
advance from 10,000 to 19,000 tons. Add to these figures
the 10,000 tons provided under the Reconstruction Finance
Corporation agreement with fo\ir other companies, plus their
existing capacity and it is quite probable, according to
present Department of Commerce estimates, that by the end
of 1942, synthetic rubber will take care of about 12^^ of
the normal demand for rubber; i.e., approximately 75,000
tons
.
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New Synthetic Plants under Construction
Company
Date of
Completion
Yearly
Capacity
in Tons
Goodyear Tire & Rubber Company April-May 1942
B. F. Goodrich Company
Firestone Tire & Rubber
Company
United States Rubber Company
DuPont Company (private
financing)
Standard Oil Company of
Louisiana (private
financing)
August 1942
August 1942
August 1942
August 1942
Late 1942 8-
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
10,000
Synthetic rubber experts are of the opinion that
if large-scale production is to be accomplished it will be
of the butadiene type which is made from petroleum products
in combination with styrene, acrylonitrile or some of the
olefins. (1)
Several factors appear to stand in the way of fur-
ther increasing synthetic rubber production, chief among
these being (1) the need for skilled labor, oils, greases,
aluminum and chemicals, equally and probably more essential
in other military production; (2) the cost of constructing
plants; (3) the cost of the finished product itself and (4)
realization that while synthetic rubber can be adapted to
certain products (in some instances its properties are
even better), on the whole it does not adapt itself to the
needs of industry as does natural ciiltivated rubber.
1. Possibilities of Producing Rubber in the United States
and Rubber Conservation, U. S. Tariff Commission,
Washington, D. C, Sept. 1941.
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An Investigation completed by the United States
Tariff Commission in September 1941 (1) indicates that the
total cost of construction of plants for the production of
butadiene, styrene, acrylonotrlle , or olefins and synthetic
rubber would probably amount to between 75 to 100 million
dollars for every 100,000 long tons of yearly synthetic
rubber capacity. And, further, a synthetic rubber plant
of 20,000 long tons capacity might be erected and equipped
in eighteen months, but because of the difficulty in ob-
taining steel and chemical equipment, possibly three to
five years would be required to construct and equip a suf-
ficient number of plants to supply America's rubber require-
ments .
Authorities on the subject are in agreement that
probably no synthetic rubber can ever be produced as cheaply
as natural rubber can be grown. Synthetic rubber has been
produced since about 1931, and has sold at 65 cents to $1.00
a pound. At best, it is believed possible that synthetic
rubber can be produced in quantity from oil products at a
cost of 25 cents a pound. By comparison the price of crude
rubber in New York since 1931 has ranged between 2t to 27
cents a pound.
1, Rubber, Possibilities of Producing Rubber in the
United States, U. S. Tariff Commission, Washington,
D. C, September 1941.
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On the basis of these facts and figures, synthetic
rubber, unless hitherto \anknown technological developments
take place, would not seem to offer any immediate solution
to the major supply problem. There can be little doubt,
however, that the production of synthetic rubber which has
proved itself so superior for special purposes, where re-
sistance to heat and oils is necessary, must increase with
governmental assistance without delay and will probably
always represent a minimxim percentage of America's rubber
supply. For economic as well as military reasons, in the
future, it seems inevitable that a given quantity of rub-
ber, consisting of reclaim, synthetic and guayule, will be
produced within the confines of the United States.
(3) Increase in the Use of Reclaim Rubber
Reclaim rubber which can be produced in rapidly
increasing amounts constitutes a tangible means of reduc-
ing crude or synthetic rubber requirements. More important
than that, however, is the fact that it can do much toward
filling in the gap until production of synthetic and gua-
yule rubber reaches appreciable quantities.
«/hile there are no definite trade figures avail-
able to support the belief, it is thought that an excess
of rubber scrap exists, scattered throughout the United
States, from which a large tonnage of reclaim can readily
be obtained. Various estimates have, however, been made
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as to the total quantity of scrap that could be collected
each year, varying all the way from 400,000 to 800,000
tons.(l) Assuming conservatively that 500,000 tons can
be collected each year, this tonnage would probably pro-
vide a like tonnage of reclaimed rubber.
The capacity of the reclaimed rubber industry
could be increased by the erection of additional plants
and the operation of existing plants at full capacity.
In 1959 there were thirty-five firms producing
reclaimed rubber. Of this number twenty- two were compan-
ies producing reclaim for their own use. At that time the
industry was operating at 11% of its 1938 capacity
(254,000 tons). However, 35^ of the plants operated be-
low the 11% average. Although it seems unlikely that all
companies could reach full capacity immediately, excess
capacity, which can readily be put to work, does exist.
Production of reclaims in 1940 amounted to
208,970 tons; in 1941 production probably reached 270,000
tons. (2) Reclaimers are now said to be operating on the
basis of 320,000 tons annually, a figure which can be in-
creased by the erection of additional reclaiming facil-
ities. The cost to augment present plant capacity by new
facilities has been estimated at ten million dollars for
every 100,000 long tons of yearly capacity. (3)
1. Rubber, Possibilities for Producing Rubber in the
United States, U. S. Tariff Commission, Washington, D.C.,
September 1941.
2. Ibid .
3. Ibid.
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Reclaim in recent months, prior to the outbreak
of war, averaged approximately 25% of the rubber used by-
manufacturers. In the past (see Chart!) ) it has repre-
sented as much as 66.7^, its chief contribution being to
hold down the cost of crude rubber during times of advanc-
ing prices
.
Reclaim is economical, both from the viewpoint
of salvaging something that would otherwise be wasted, and
from the viewpoint of cost. Whereas crude rubber sells at
22^^ per pound, reclaim can probably be turned out at
per pound. This figure is based on the fact that reclaim
rubber for use in tires has been sold at 6 to 7fjz^ a pound
for the past three years. (1)
Naturally there is a limit to the number of times
rubber may be reclaimed. That its quality decreases with
each reclaiming is an established and unalterable fact.
Therefore, if imports of crude rubber are entirely cut off
over a period of several years more than three — re-
claim as a saving factor to the rubber industry will be of
negligible importance. Its potentialities during the
present emergency, however, which it is hoped will not be
prolonged beyond the three-year period suggested, are and
can continue to be of great consequence meantime.
1. Rubber Age
,
January 1942, p. 279

Chart D. CRUDE MiD RECLAIMED RUBBER
CONSUMPTION, PRICE and RATES
1926-19A1
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Source: Rubber ITanufa^tur^r^^

Crude and Reclaimed Rubber- Consump+ion, Price, Rafio
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(4) Increase In the Use of Guayule
Tile possibilities inherent in Ouayule rubber have
previously been considered in part. At present Guayule, a
native of North Central Mexico and the Big Rend area of
Texas, is being grown experimentally in the Salinas Valley
of California and other areas of the southwest have been
suggested as possible growing areas.
Production of Guayule in 1941 amounted to but
4,000 tons; in 1942, with increased facilities, production
may reach 7,000 tons.
Congressman John Q. Anderson of California recent-
ly introduced a bill (H.R. 5050) providing for the planting
of 45,000 acres in Guayule shrub in the United States from
funds to be made available, of $25,000,000 and for the es-
tablishment of extracting facilities at federal expense.
The emended bill designed to give the Secretary of Agri-
culture authority to lease 75,000 acres of land to grow
Guayule, particularly in California, New Mexico and Texas
and process the resulting yield was passed by the Senate in
February 1942. In addition to this the bill authorized the
payment of |2, 000, 000 to the Intercontinental Rubber Company
for its processing plant, nurseries and seeds of improved
strain.
It has been definitely proven that Guayule can be
successfully grown within the confines of the United States.
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Prom the viewpoint of cost and yield it probably offers
the best economic solution that has yet come to light to
supplement imports of crude rubber which are now so ser-
iously affected, and may or may not be resximed for a per-
iod of years.
It is estimated that if all the seeds available
were planted immediately there would be enough seedlings
to plant 45,000 acres of Gueyule (20% resin content) in
the spring of 1942, which would yield 1,500 long tons of
deresinated rubber in 1943; 5,400 tons in 1944; and 21,300
tons in 1946. (1) In 1943 there could be made available
sufficient seedlings to plant 450,000 acres (an area of
little less than two-thirds the size of Rhode Island)
which might yield 15,000 tons In 1944; 54,000 tons in
1945 or 213,000 tons in 1947.
For best economic results Guayule should be ex-
tracted from shrubs about four years old. Starting with
a cost of 80 cents a pound of rubber when the plant is
harvested in one year, the cost decreases every year un-
til the plant is seven years, when the carrying charges
begin to exceed the increment in value. At four years
the cost is 15 cents to 19 cents per pound, exclusive of
interest on investment and cost of deresinating. (2)
1. "Rubber Svirvey," India Rubber World , November 1941,
p. 156.
2. Loc. cit.
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Unlike synthetic (chemical) rubber, Guayule prod-
uct would utilize land and migrant labor not at present
employed and would not require large quantities of steel,
chemicals and chemical equipment. While a shortage of
planting material limits the quantity of rubber which can
be produced from Guayule in the next few years, investiga-
tion shows that this former native of North Central Mexico,
more than any other plant, meets the climatic, agricultural
and mechanical requirements essential to its successful de-
velopment in the United States. There is little doubt that
d\iring and after the present emergency annual acreage of
Guayiile will be increased year by year to provide part of
a minimum reserve that will act as a "buffer" against pos-
sible future contingencies of a like nature,
(5) Government Development of Rubber Production
in the Western Hemisphere
The danger of remote rubber sources and the pos-
sible disastrous effect on our national economy was brought
to the fore once again in 1939, with the spread of the pres-
ent war. Recognition of the danger by President Roosevelt
and certain cabinet members eventually led to the passage
of a bill by Congress in June, 1940. This bill provided
half a million dollers "to enable the Secretary of Agricul-
ture to conduct investigations directed toward the develop-
ment of rubber production in the Western Hemisphere,
«
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Including production breeding and disease research; survey
of potential rubber producing areas, establishment and op-
eration of experiment and demonstration stations in suit-
able locations, acquisition of land for such purposes; con-
struction of necessary buildings." (1) The money was made
available in July 1940,
Cooperative programs by mixed commissions in fif-
teen of the Latin American countries were speedily formu-
lated and placed into operation.
Six months of intensive surveying of potential
rubber areas in equatorial America proved that cultivated
rubber can be successfully produced in this hemisphere. The
purpose of the surveys, however, completed in March 1941,
was not so much to prove that plantation rubber production
was possible as to get the work started in a material way.
By means of the wide plant collection and assembling at
strategic points, production has been started. The decision
was made to assemble high-yielding clones of Hevea for rapid
multiplication of budwood at central propogating stations in
Honduras and Haiti and to establish seedling nurseries in
all cooperating countries for reception of budwood. The
central and southern American countries cooperating are:
Mexico, Guatemala, Honduras, British Hondi^ras, Nicaragua,
Panama, Venezuela, Colombia, Equador, Peru, Bolivia, Brazil,
1. Brandies, Dr. E. W., Rubber on the Rebound, East to
West, Industrial Reference Service, #21, May 1941.
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Cuba, Haiti and the Dominican Republic. The first shipment
of budded st\amps arrived in Honduras in November 1940. Of
this shipment 60% is now growing at the propogation sta-
tions. At best, however, it will take until the early part
of 1943 to start plantations and bring the seedlings to
maturity and five years more before tapping may commence.
Crude rubber planting of this kind in the Western
Hemisphere, therefore, does not present itself as an immed-
iate solution to the present problem since it will take at
least seven years to ten before any large quantities can be
secured.
(6) Changes in Compoimding
The rapid development of the rubber industry in
this country proves that few things are impossible. The
discoveries of Charles Goodyear, Arthur Marks, George
Oenslager and scores of others, coming at crucial times in
the history of the industry, are indications in themselves
that the task which faces rubber processors today — to
produce an increasing quantity of rubber goods from a fixed
or decreasing supply of crude rubber and reclaim — is not
insurmountable
.
Germany, it would seem, has solved a similar prob-
lem in a satisfactory manner. Import records show that
prior to her march into Czecho-Slovakia Germany had begun
building up rubber reserves. Encouragement was also given
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to the production of synthetic rubber by subsidization and
to increased reclaiming facilities. As a further step,
government regulations regarding compounding were put into
effect, government chemists determining, in each case, how
many pieces of a given article were to be produced from an
established amount of crude and/or reclaim rubber. (1) The
manuf ect\arer was thereby forced to adapt his compounds to
the lower rubber content and there is every reason to be-
lieve advances in compounding were achieved through compe-
tition. Certain standardization in regard to the variety
of types and gradual elimination of colored articles must
have resulted.
The quality of many of the rubber articles pro-
duced in this country today is probably out of proportion
to actual requirements. As a nation America leads the
world as producers of high-quality goods. If rubber tech-
nicians concentrate on the problem of producing more rubber
goods by using less rubber in the same way that they have
worked to improve the quality of rubber products, appreci-
able quantities of this vital crude material will be saved.
Although up to this point government regulations
have been directed at the elimination of non-essential rub-
ber items (rubber toys, rubber balls, bathing caps, and
similar goods) and the placing of essential goods on a
1. Rostler, Fritz, "Compounding Rubber for Conservation,"
India Rubber World, September 1, 1941, p. 35.
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quota basis, it is more than probable that as the situa-
tion grows increasingly serious, government regulations
regarding compounding will be instituted. This is con-
firmed by the ruling issued by the War Production Board
on February 1, 1942, which states that all rubber products
permitted under the government program must conform with
specifications laid down from time to time. This means
that the War Production Board, after technical studies,
may order reduction in the weight of crude rubber used in
any permissible product.

CONCLUSION
The rubber supply problem of American industry
has been a matter of real national concern over a long
period of time. Prior to the International Rubber Regula-
tion Agreement in establishing control over supplies and
prices, the ups and downs of the market were such as to
be commercially tragic. llBhile the effective working of
this control medium since 1937 has reduced the price
swings to narrow limits, in another sense it has undoubt-
edly lulled government and industry alike with a sense of
false security as no great efforts have been made toward
securing an all-American supply of crude rubber.
The outbreak of war with Japan found the United
States with e stock of approximately 600,000 tons of crude
rubber on hand — about a year»s supply. The theory against
accumulation of large reserves was that supplies had been
coming through from the Par East in satisfactory quantities,
despite the war in Europe, and that if or when the supply
should cease, synthetic plants could be built and put into
operation within a year and a half's time.
With the far-reaching advances made by the Japanese
armies since December 7, 1941, America is now faced with the
complete loss of rubber shipments from the Per East for an
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indefinite period of time. At best it may be a matter of
months; more probably it will require years before sizable
shipments of rubber are resumed. The unknown quantities
not only include when and in whose favor the war will end
but what damage has been done to the great plantation areas
in the Far East.
Surveys which have been completed in relation to
other sources for crude rubber indicate that the countries
in the Western Hemisphere will not supply any great quan-
tity of rubber until 1947 or 1948, and that the Guayule
program, approved by Congress, will not produce more than
50,000 tons annually for the next few years.
Two possibilities, aided by a third but limited
factor, stand out in more favorable light. These are syn-
thetic rubber production, advances in compounding tech-
niques and the augmentation of present crude rubber stocks
by continued production of reclaim.
Although there still appears to be considerable
doubt as to whether the huge synthetic rubber program,
which has as sn objective productive capacity of 400,000
tons annually, can be partially achieved before present
stocks of crude rubber and reclaim dwindle to nothing,
confidence is expressed in some quarters that the building
of synthetic plants on a wholesale scale can be done.
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A factor which has imdoubtedly retarded large-
scale synthetic production is the possibility of serious
economic repercussions after the war. Native rubber, in
free competition would, of course, undersell the synthetic
product in view of production costs* The economic aspects
which may develop at the conclusion of hostilities, how-
ever, it would seem, will have to be placed to one side
for the time being. How long the war will last no one
knows. On the other hand, the need for rubber to keep
the wheels of industry and of victory rolling is a press-
ing and present problem.
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